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INTRODUCTION
The debate over parity—the relative competence of state and federal
courts, particularly in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights—
has a long pedigree. It began in 1787, at the Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia.1 Most everyone agreed on the establishment of a single
supreme court to give voice to a uniform body of federal law.2 But views
differed about the lower federal courts. Some, like James Madison,
wanted to mandate such courts.3 Others, like Roger Sherman, thought the
state courts could handle federal business first.4 Eventually, the delegates
punted and left it up to Congress to allocate judicial power.5
Some two hundred years later, in 1977, Professor Burt Neuborne
ignited the contemporary parity debate by making a detailed criticism of
the competence of state courts as frontline enforcers of federal rights,
animated by his own experience as a civil rights litigator.6 Neuborne
believed that, in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce federal
rights, civil rights litigants were much more likely to secure effective

1. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
2. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
3. Resolutions Proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787, in NOTES OF DEBATES
IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (1987).
4. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 1:125.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). The parity debate was
prefigured by earlier waves of legal discourse grappling with much the same comparative problematics.
From approximately the 1920s through the 1960s, calls to abolish diversity jurisdiction argued that state
courts should be trusted to treat outsiders fairly; that state courts were better able to interpret their own
laws; and states, as sovereigns within our federal system, deserved the respect of noninterference from
the federal courts. See Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483 (1927); George Cochran Doub, Time for Re-evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?,
44 A.B.A. J. 243 (1958); see also Robert J. Sheran & Barbara Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State
Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1978); Leslie A. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court
Jurisdiction, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1203 (1965). And scholars, practitioners, and judges were nearly uniform
in their insistence that the federal courts were overburdened with newly-created federal statutory rights
(e.g., those stemming from the Jones Act) and had to let go of other types of claims in exchange. Diversity
seemed like the logical choice. See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). See, e.g., Howard C. Bratton, Diversity
Jurisdiction—An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976); David L. Shapiro, Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1977).
Similarly, the parity debate of the 1970s–1990s took place against a backdrop of anxiety about
the federal courts’ workload. See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 643 (1974); Tom C. Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts,
8 ST. MARY’S L.J. 407 (1976). Such debates are rooted in the design of our federal system itself—after
all, the framers provided for diversity jurisdiction precisely because they contemplated the possibility of
state-court prejudice. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Herbert Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239–40
(1948). Neuborne’s article broke new ground, but draws upon longstanding allocational tensions.
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relief in federal court.7
But Neuborne offered more than a how-to guide for litigants. He
exposed what he viewed as the U.S. Supreme Court’s assumption that
state and federal courts were in parity as it decided questions about the
allocation of judicial power between state and federal courts.8 In the
course of doing so, Neuborne gestured at a number of institutional
parameters that could, in theory, be measured empirically to provide a
positive answer to the parity question.
Neuborne’s work on parity struck a nerve. Some scholars endorsed the
possibility of empiricism as a means of allocating cases between state and
federal court; others rejected this position, invoking methodological and
normative concerns. Professor Akhil Amar argued that the framers of
Article III had already resolved the parity debate. Amar’s influential twotier thesis would require federal judges to handle federal question claims
in either the first or last instance.9
Professor Martin Redish offered another view, arguing instead that
Congress bears primary allocational responsibility.10 Anticipating current
dissatisfaction with the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrines of prudential
abstention, Redish argued for judicial deference to the jurisdictional
statutes that govern access to federal court.11 Paradoxically, his critique
was based in part on the contention that a satisfactory answer to the parity
question required empirical evidence, but that such evidence was
methodologically impossible to procure. Therefore, Redish argued that
scholars should drop the parity question altogether.12 Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky offered a simpler method, framing issues of parity in terms
of litigants’ forum selection; he was content to sidestep the empirical
question and trust the lawyers.13
Indeed, a striking feature of parity scholarship has been its tendency to
proclaim the parity debate at an end.14 In the past two decades, the parity
debate has gone dormant, and the few articles that do call for its revival

7. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1115.
8. Id. at 1130–31.
9. Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,
65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985).
10. Martin Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on
Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988).
11. Id. at 343–45.
12. Id. at 330.
13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 604–
06 (1991).
14. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259; Chemerinsky, Ending the
Parity Debate, supra note 13.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

3

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY

71

have gone largely unheeded.15 Even Neuborne recanted, acknowledging
that changes in the identity of the judges staffing state and federal courts
may alter forum preference for the enforcement of civil rights claims.16
Just as parity was disappearing from law reviews, empiricists began
developing and applying more sophisticated modeling techniques to
assess the institutional parameters identified by Neuborne and others.
These methods evaluate a surprisingly broad range of judicial behaviors
and characteristics of state and federal court systems. Although it does
not self-consciously attempt to extend the parity debate, the new
scholarship on parity offers evidence called for by earlier writers.
Building on the new empiricism, this Article urges a reframing of the
parity debate. Rather than focusing on the narrow question of the
willingness and ability of state courts to enforce federal rights, the
concern with state–federal parity should embrace a broader range of
jurisdictional concurrency. Rather than attempting to influence the U.S.
Supreme Court’s allocational decisions, the new empirics will better
assist other actors in the state–federal judicial partnership. This Article
therefore recommends that scholars interested in the relationship between
state and federal courts focus on the comparative capacity of these court
systems. So conceived, the parity question is methodologically tractable
in light of intervening developments in the social sciences. The question
is also newly relevant as movements for racial justice are actively working
to abolish qualified immunity, grappling with whether this goal is better
pursued at the state level, the federal level, or both.17
Part I of this Article provides a critical recapitulation of three themes
that animated the parity debate as it unfolded some forty years ago,
providing an intellectual history of this literature that explains why the
parity debate ended—and why empirics are unhelpful to the debate as
originally conceived. In particular, the parity debate foundered on its
preoccupation with criticizing U.S. Supreme Court allocational decisions
on the mistaken assumption that the doctrine was based on an empirical
concept of state–federal court equivalence.
Part II argues for the possibility of a theoretically sophisticated
15. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991).
16. Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 797 (1995).
17. Section 4 of the BREATHE Act, drafted by the Movement for Black Lives, would abolish
qualified immunity under federal law, abrogating that part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s § 1983
jurisprudence. See MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, THE BREATHE ACT: SECTION 4: HOLDING OFFICIALS
ACCOUNTABLE & ENHANCING SELF-DETERMINATION OF BLACK COMMUNITIES 7,
https://breatheact.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Section-4-The-BREATHE-Act-Summary.pdf (last
visited September 28, 2021); see also Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing
Reforms to Eliminate Qualified Immunity, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (June 22, 2020, 11:31
AM),
https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-passes-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminatequalified-immunity.
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empiricism of parity. It begins by retheorizing the parity debate itself.
Then, the Part proposes a new model, conceiving of parity in terms of the
comparative capacity of the state and federal court systems. Part II also
shows that although empirics are of limited relevance to the allocational
emphasis of the parity debate of the 1970s and 1980s, they are critical to
a comparative notion of parity that contemplates a wider array of
decisionmakers within the court systems.
Part III maps the existing empirical and methodological literature onto
the comparative capacity model. In short, the data that earlier parity
scholars feared were impossible to collect have, for the most part, already
been gathered and analyzed.
Part IV discusses the implications of the new empirics of parity, calling
for three changes in orientation to parity scholarship. First, given that
both the state and federal courts must hear many cases every year
regardless of whether particular classes of cases are allocated to one
system or the other, the debate must focus primarily on helping both types
of courts to perform at their best. Scholarship in this vein might
productively be addressed to Congress and the state legislatures, whose
job it is to resource the courts. Second, Part IV invites federal courts
scholars to consider where existing jurisdictional doctrine opens the door
for judges beyond those on the U.S. Supreme Court to consider empirical
information comparing the state and federal courts. In particular, habeas
and abstention cases are opportunities for litigants to brief, and federal
district judges to evaluate, the quality of state-court adjudication. Finally,
Part IV advocates the creation of a new normative model of an adequate
court system. Such a model could be used to develop comparative
empirical assessments of state and federal courts, in turn giving rise to a
new set of arguments for directing resources or shifting allocational
doctrine.
I. RETHEORIZING THE PARITY DEBATE
“The parity debate” is not one debate, but several. The claim that the
conversation must come to an end, paradoxically, because it depends on
intractable empirical questions is, at best, true as to only some of the many
parity debates. This Part shows how empirical and normative questions
matter differently in different discursive contexts, assessing parity at
different levels of scale and with regard to different legal actors. By
clarifying this conversation, this Part shows how it can move forward. It
begins by distinguishing three separate parity debates, focusing in turn on
the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the individual litigant. Next, it
provides a critical intellectual history of the parity debate, tracing the
empirical and normative responses to Neuborne’s landmark article and
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identifying productive and reductive interventions on both fronts.
Finally, it focuses on the main theoretical problem of the earlier parity
debate: its inability to recognize that it is not one, but many.
The parity debate has operated at three levels of scale—levels that
differ in their respective susceptibility to empirical analysis. The first
debate asks how the U.S. Supreme Court should allocate claims between
the state court systems in the aggregate and the federal court system as a
whole. The second takes place at the level of Congress, which passes
jurisdictional statutes allocating particular causes of action to state court,
federal court, or both. These statutes, combined with the Court’s
allocational jurisprudence, create a framework of concurrency within
which empirical inquiries operate and become relevant.
The third debate takes place at the level of the individual litigant.
(Here, the term “litigant” describes the party, often acting with advice of
counsel.) Within the framework of concurrency created by Congress and
the Court, litigants determine where to file claims. Whereas Congress
and the Court make allocational decisions by comparing the state and
federal court systems as a whole, litigants make their personal allocational
decisions with regard to a small and specific set of fora. The scope of
relevant factual information is thus far more constricted and, as a result,
can be richer and more detailed.
Each of these debates draws upon different sources of information and
law. The first and second have the power to shape the law; the third deals
with law and facts as they exist. Empirical evidence, then, varies in the
role it plays depending on the parity debate one is having. The next
Sections question how some prior writers on parity have mapped empirics
onto each level of scale and propose an alternate mapping.
A. Framing the Parity Debate: An Outcome-Driven Empirics of
Constitutional Rights
The existing parity debate has been made less generative by its
obsessive topical focus on constitutional rights, especially those
associated with left politics. The resulting discursive trajectory has shaped
the theorization of parity as well as its empirical assessment. Nearly every
entrant to the field responds to Burt Neuborne’s landmark 1977 article
The Myth of Parity. That article begins with a discussion of Stone v.
Powell,18 a Fourth Amendment habeas case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court “appeared to assume that state and federal courts are functionally
interchangeable forums likely to provide equivalent protection for federal

18. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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constitutional rights.”19
Neuborne then moves to a forceful critique of that perspective: “I
suggest that the assumption of parity is, at best, a dangerous myth,
fostering forum allocation decisions which channel constitutional
adjudication under the illusion that state courts will vindicate federally
secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower federal
courts.”20 The scope of Neuborne’s argument is confined to the relative
competencies of state and federal courts in the adjudication of
constitutional rights, making the argument that federal courts are more
plaintiff-friendly. Neuborne nowhere claims that his article does any
more than this; the text is explicitly grounded in his own practice as a civil
liberties lawyer.21
The second part of the article takes up two empirical assumptions
around which Neuborne structured his own litigation practice. First is
that “persons advancing federal constitutional claims against local
officials will fare better, as a rule, in a federal, rather than a state, trial
court.”22 The second assumption is that, “to a somewhat lesser degree,
federal district courts are institutionally preferable to state appellate
courts as forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims.”23
Neuborne “kn[e]w of no empirical studies that prove (or undermine) those
assumptions,” and proceeded to lay out a series of institutional parameters
that were relevant to his determination of whether state courts were
trustworthy arbiters of constitutional rights.24 In essence, the article
sketches out an empirical rebuttal, based on a loose form of autoethnography, to what Neuborne views as the U.S. Supreme Court’s
implicit empirical claim about the equivalence of state and federal
courts.25
Subsequent writers have advanced the parity debate on the grounds of
Neuborne’s rebuttal: by attempting to pursue the empirical inquiries that
Neuborne outlined; by justifying or attacking, on doctrinal and normative
grounds, the Court’s “assum[ption] that no factors exist which render
federal district courts more effective than state trial or appellate courts for
the enforcement of federal constitutional rights”26; and by providing
alternate approaches to the assessment of state–federal court parity with
regard to constitutional rights. Commentators after Neuborne, therefore,
19. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1115.
22. Id. at 1115–16.
23. Id. at 1116.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1117; see also AUTO/ETHNOGRAPHY: REWRITING THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL (Deborah
Reed-Danahay ed., 1997).
26. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY

75

have let his article establish the boundaries of the parity discussion in a
way that Neuborne himself never explicitly intended.27
Neuborne begins his process of empirical modeling by arguing that
parity (particularly within the habeas context) is often assessed via “a
comparison that tends to measure the federal district courts against state
appellate courts,” and suggests instead that a cleaner assessment begins
with a more rigorous theorization of “which state forum should be
compared with the federal district courts to determine whether a
comparative advantage exists.”28 Neuborne advocates an apples-toapples comparison of state trial courts with federal district courts.29
Chemerinsky views the question as systemic, arguing that “[t]he parity
question demands an overall comparison of the federal courts with the
state courts,” but noting that the heterogeneity of both systems undermine
the usefulness of such a comparison even if it could be produced.30 Others
have viewed the question as answerable only from the litigant’s
perspective31 (which, as Resnik reminds us, must include recognition that
“the often-invoked description of the federal courts as comprised of a
three-tiered pyramid of courts fails to capture the sprawling structure into
which the federal judicial system, consisting of courts, agencies, and
private-affiliated decision makers, has evolved.”).32
Amar thinks Neuborne’s model is too narrow, framing the parity
question as “about state court jurisdiction versus the federal judicial
power of the United States as a whole.”33 In particular, Amar identifies
the failure of the federal court system as a whole to perform this appellate
function as the fulcrum of the parity question:
If the Supreme Court cannot discharge its appellate function today, the real
question is whether lower federal courts need to fill the breach because
they have constitutional parity with the Supreme Court in a way that state
courts do not, and because they are article III tribunals in a way that state
courts are not.34

27. Ann Althouse, Federal Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Federal Rights: Can Congress
Bring Back the Warren Era?, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1067, 1070 (1995) (“One would think, then, that
the ‘Myth of Parity’ exercise would need to be wholly redone in response to changed conditions. Indeed,
one might also question whether the subjective observations of a lawyer for a particular subcategory of
litigants ought ever to have had great persuasive pull.”).
28. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1118.
29. Id. at 1119.
30. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599–600; see also Chemerinsky,
Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259.
31. Redish, supra note 10, at 336.
32. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 172 (1995).
33. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645.
34. Id. at 646–48.
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For Amar, then, the Constitution also commands a recognition that the
two systems are not similarly situated.
Some writers imply that the entire project of finding proper
comparators is specious. For Wells, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
is to blame by creating unstable doctrinal terrain:
The Court insists that there is parity, but does not specify precisely what it
means by parity: does it deem state courts the virtual equals of federal
courts, in that the outcome of a suit would be the same in state as in federal
court, or does it acknowledge a gap yet consider that gap too small to
require a federal forum?35

Without clarity in the doctrine, it is impossible to develop a comparative
methodological approach. Elsewhere, Wells has identified this as the
definitional problem of “weak” versus “strong” conceptions of parity:
The assertion of parity between state and federal courts may refer to a claim
that a litigant will receive a constitutionally adequate hearing on a federal
claim in state court. In contrast with this ‘weak’ sense of parity, the
‘strong’ sense of the term signifies the fungible nature of state and federal
courts and the absence of a systematic difference in outcomes whether
cases are allotted to state or federal courts.36

A conspicuous problem of the literature is the lack of robust
theorization that Wells identifies. Without a prior model of parity as
strong (implying that courts of original jurisdiction in both systems are
the relevant points of comparison), weak (implying that attention to the
institutional characteristics of, and outcomes in, state court is adequate
perhaps without comparison to federal court), or something else entirely
à la Amar, it is difficult to develop a rigorous research design.
Neuborne also notes that state courts need not act in bad faith to be
unreliable: the “comparison need only suggest that given the institutional
differences between the two benches, state trial judges are less likely to
resolve arguable issues in favor of protecting federal constitutional rights
than are their federal brethren.”37 This strongly implies that outcome,
rather than process, is—for Neuborne—the relevant metric.
Indeed, subsequent efforts by federal courts scholars to take up
Neuborne’s empirical charge have largely focused on whether
constitutional rights plaintiffs get the same kinds of outcomes in state and
federal courts.38 Eisenberg, for example, conducted a descriptive study
35. Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1988).
36. Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 610 (1991).
37. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1119–20.
38. But win rates are not necessarily indicative about much regarding a court system as a whole.
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the
Legal System: Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998).
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based on a sample of § 1983 cases filed in the Central District of
California in 1975 and 1976, concluding that such cases (surprisingly)
were not overburdening the federal court system.39 Gerry, in 1999,
compared state and federal district court interpretations of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, concluding that the court systems are
“startling in their similarity.”40 Marvell, in 1984, claimed that “parity
does not exist” on the basis of data about lawyers’ rationales for forum
selection in student rights cases.41 Rubenstein used a similar outcomesoriented research design to contest Neuborne’s central point, using his
experience as a gay-rights litigator in the 1990s to argue that state courts
are actually more favorable to the assertion of individual rights than
federal courts.42 Solimine and Walker’s 1983 study is perhaps the best
known of such outcome-focused work, defining parity as existing “if,
holding all other factors constant, a litigant is, on the average, equally
successful in both the federal and state court systems.”43 They found,
rather flatly, that, taking state appellate courts into account, parity does
exist.44 And Urquhart, writing in 2011, adopts Solimine and Walker’s
methods to compare the success rates of litigants asserting federal claims
after Younger proceedings in state courts versus federal courts, finding
much higher success rates in the latter circumstance.45 But such onedimensional focus on outcomes alone has been critiqued. The serious
methodological problems with such studies notwithstanding,46 outcomes

39. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study,
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 521–24 (1981).
40. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower
Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
233, 241, 285 (1999).
41. Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical
Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 1315, 1338–39, 1358 (1984) (asserting that
parity does not exist, empirically, and lawyers stating that federal judges are more likely to enforce federal
law, among other reasons for choosing federal court). This study is an example of how earlier empirical
studies of parity made claims that were disproportionately broad as compared with what their results
show—here, claiming that parity simply does not exist, rather than asserting more modestly that the study
showed substantial differences between the state and federal courts regarding one area of law, from the
litigant perspective.
42. See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599
(1999).
43. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 232 (1983).
44. Id. at 232, 250. This is another study that overclaims.
45. Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective,
12 NEV. L.J. 1, 3, 44, 47 (2011). This study has serious methodological flaws, many of which are also
present in Solimine & Walker, supra note 43: the use of a date range that seems arbitrary, reliance on
Westlaw, undertheorized and informal approaches to coding, and an unsystematic approach to checking
one’s work.
46. See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 261–69 (highlighting
methodological problems in the Walker & Solimine study, including: a focus only on decisions rather
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alone are most relevant under strong-parity models that define parity as
the complete fungibility of the two court systems.47
Finally, Neuborne challenged the assumption that federal judges are
“carpetbaggers,” instead emphasizing that they are “root[ed] in the
communities they serve” just as much as state judges. 48 Other
commentators did not really take up this point; thus, it is hard to know
whether they agree with Neuborne or simply think the issue irrelevant.
After sweeping away what he viewed as incorrect factual assumptions,
Neuborne built his comparative model by laying out “three sets of
reasons” that support plaintiffs’ civil liberties attorneys’ preferences for
federal fora.49 Neuborne, unlike subsequent writers on parity, did not
claim that these three reasons formed a comprehensive, comparative
model of parity. They are: (1) the judges’ technical competence—
Neuborne believed federal judges to be more competent; (2) the judges’
“psychological set”—Neuborne believed federal judges to be more
amenable than state judges to plaintiffs asserting federal constitutional
claims; and (3) the federal courts’ relatively greater “insulation from
majoritarian pressures,” making them “structurally preferable to state trial
court as a forum in which to challenge powerful local interests.”50
Most contributors to the parity literature seem to agree with Neuborne
that federal judges are more competent. Such competence includes not
only the judges’ own technical skills, but also structural features of federal
courts that (in these writers’ view) enable any judge to perform her best
work. These features include comparatively higher pay, the higher
numbers and perceived greater talents of law clerks to which they have
access, and their somewhat more leisurely schedule.51 The greater
selectivity and prestige of the federal bench is considered to draw a higher
caliber of lawyer—though lawyer quality is not often defined in these
writings—than the state bench.52 Chemerinsky cautions that “there is no
than including cases that settle, not taking account of the potential that state and federal courts may not be
deciding a similar pool of cases depending on rates of and reasons for settlement, focusing only on state
appellate courts without controlling for how many cases are appealed and on what grounds, not accounting
for differences in the subject matter of cases or whether they are comparable in their substantive content,
not analyzing the comparative likelihood that Congress as opposed to state legislatures will enact
unconstitutional criminal statutes, not controlling for the availability of removal by claim type, not relying
on independent metrics of court quality, not controlling for federal courts ruling against a claim on
procedural grounds, and making an apples-to-oranges comparison of federal district and state appellate
courts).
47. Wells, supra note 36, at 610; see also Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53; Neuborne, supra
note 16, at 797, 803; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 228.
48. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1120.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1120–21.
51. Paul Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
605, 623 (1981).
52. Id.
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reason to believe that ‘better’ judges will produce decisions that
systematically favor individual rights,” pointing to Justice Antonin Scalia
and former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski as two federal judges who
were widely considered brilliant but who rarely decided in favor of
individual rights.53 From a litigant-choice perspective, Flango notes that
attorneys themselves “tend to view federal judges as better trained, better
supported with resources, and more impartial because they are not
elected,” and that such attorneys attempt to funnel complex litigation to
federal court in the belief that federal judges are better equipped to handle
such cases.54 But this may perpetuate a vicious cycle: state judges cannot
be expected to manage complex questions of federal law if they never get
a chance to do so.55 Others have noted that it is unfair to scrutinize the
competence of state-court judges in interpreting federal law without
asking how good federal judges are at interpreting state law, such as in
diversity cases.56 Yet the precise contours of judicial competence remain
unmapped.
Neuborne’s theory of “psychological set,” by contrast, has not been
received as enthusiastically. Though Neuborne identifies it as one of his
three primary reasons for preferring federal court, only Chemerinsky
mentions it, and at some remove.57 Some writers evaluate the
consequences of judges’ relative levels of insulation from majoritarian
and quotidian pressures; Bator, for example, cites the “intuitive”
contention that a “sensitivity to federal rights is reinforced by the federal
judges’ relative insulation from the daily grind of legal administration in
our state and municipal lower criminal, family, and civil courts, which is
said to breed cynicism and callousness with respect to abstract-sounding
constitutional rights.”58
Neuborne identifies the structural insulation created by Article III’s
appointment and life tenure provisions as crucial to federal judges’
greater, even countermajoritarian inclination to enforce constitutional
rights.59 Redish regards these protections as definitive: “the absence of
prophylactic protections of state judicial salary and tenure is so
53. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599.
54. Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice between State and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REV. 961,
973–74 (1995).
55. See Althouse, supra note 27, at 1078–79; Evan Tsen Lee, On the Received Wisdom in Federal
Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1123 (1999); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 6, at 1129; Gil
Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 97–99 (2009).
56. Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1293, 1299–1300 (2003); Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State
Institutional Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1173 (2007).
57. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 277.
58. Bator, supra note 51, at 623.
59. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1127.
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inconsistent with concepts of basic fairness as to violate procedural due
process.”60 Bator concedes that federal judges are probably better
“insulated from majoritarian pressures and will therefore be more
receptive to controversial and unpopular constitutional principles,” but
aspires nonetheless to help state courts “become a more hospitable forum,
that the rhetoric of parity becomes reality.”61 No commentators seriously
challenge the countermajoritarian affordances of Article III.62 The
question becomes whether state judges can judge fairly despite being
subject to electoral pressures.63
In The Myth of Parity, Neuborne’s empirics of experience, mobilized
to critique the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisdictional decisions,
invited subsequent commentators to think about parity as exclusively
allocational and susceptible to assessment solely by recourse to case
outcomes. This approach to parity is valuable in its own right, but limited,
and the debate has consequently run aground. But this narrow view of
parity contains within it a broader comparative terrain. Neuborne’s “three
sets of reasons” draw in questions of judicial decision-making, litigant
behavior, the resourcing of court systems, and the relationship between
jurisdictional doctrines and the lower-court judges who must implement
them.
B. Parity for Whom? Assessing Parity at Different Levels of Scale
To model parity empirically requires an answer to the antecedent
question, “parity for whom?” The parity debate has stalled in large part
because this question has not been theorized nor even fully surfaced. And
parity looks much different from the vantage point of each actor and level
of scale within the judicial system.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s responsibility is to assess the federal system
as a whole, as compared with the state system as a whole, in making
allocational decisions. The fundamental ground of this particular debate
60. Redish, supra note 10, at 335–36.
61. Bator, supra note 51, at 623–24.
62. See also Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 275–76; Amanda Frost &
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2010).
63. Solimine proposes avenues for further research. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of
Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1471–72 (2005). The empirical literature indicates that elections
do have substantial impact on how state judges make decisions—see notes 168–195, infra, and
accompanying text. See also Frost & Lindquist, supra note 62, at 722–23; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1440–41, 1441–42
(1999). But see Bator, supra note 51, at 624 (“[I]t is virtually inevitable that state courts will in fact
continue to be asked to play a substantial role in the formulation and application of federal constitutional
principles; the arguments in favor of the federal forum will not lead to a monopoly. If this is so, a new
problem of fundamental significance emerges: we must try to create conditions to assure optimal
performance by the state courts.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY

81

is Article III. Jurisdictional statutes and the Court’s own allocational
jurisprudence are also relevant, not least as objects of critique.64 First,
normative views about state sovereignty dictate allocational approach.65
That is, the Court often deals with allocation as a pure question of law,
whether formally or functionally.66 The empirical design implication of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s allocational task—to the extent that the Court
or its observers seek to approach this work empirically, which this Article
later argues that it (mostly) does not and should not—is that the Court
needs both to have and to understand data on the aggregate federal courts
and the aggregate state courts, so that it can direct classes of cases to
classes of courts. As others have pointed out,67 such an empirical task is
difficult, if not impossible, posing conceptual problems of sampling and
variability and practical problems of data collection and analysis. In part
for this reason, commentators such as Amar and Redish have argued that
parity should be assessed exclusively as a constitutional and perhaps
statutory issue.68
Litigants, by contrast, have responsibilities only to themselves.
Litigants want to win and to feel fairly heard.69 Parity from the litigant
perspective looks very much like a comparison of win rates under
particular doctrinal conditions in the first instance—“strong parity”—and
like a set of parameters for procedural fairness and constitutional
adequacy in the second instance—“weak parity.”70 The litigant-choice
model advanced by Chemerinsky and others is therefore unsatisfying on
its own. Even if we agree that as a matter of law litigants have a choice
between federal and state courts where concurrent jurisdiction exists, we
may still be interested in how they exercise that freedom of choice. That
is, litigant choice should be used not to foreclose, but rather to structure
empirics of parity. Information on attorneys’ strategic decisions under
conditions of concurrency tells us that, at a minimum, litigants often view
the systems as different.71 In turn, litigants jockey for competitive
64. Amar and Redish, for example, are thinking about parity essentially from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s perspective. See Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649; Redish, supra
note 10, at 336.
65. See Part II, infra, for further discussion.
66. Id.
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 599–600; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214–15;
Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645–46.
68. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645; Redish, supra note 10, at
332–33.
69. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988).
70. Wells, supra note 36, at 610; Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 602–
04.
71. Flango, supra note 54, at 973–74; Seinfeld, supra note 55, at 138; Solimine & Walker, supra
note 43, at 245; Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383,

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/2

14

McBride: Parity as Comparative Capacity

82

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

advantage, giving rise to normative questions about how and whether
jurisdictional design should privilege certain litigants.72 Parity for
litigants is therefore partially empirical and partially normative. But the
empirical information on which litigants rely is likely to be that of lived
experience.73 The prospect of moving beyond such rules of thumb to drill
down into comparative data at the level of the individual court is as
daunting as the prospect of aggregating such data.
At the highest level of abstraction—for U.S. Supreme Court Justices—
empirics may not be possible, useful, or normatively desirable.
Nonetheless, the Court processes hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
petitions seeking review of state court decisions each year, providing the
Justices with valuable, if slanted, information about lower courts’
behavior.74 At the lowest, most granular level—for litigants—a rough
empiricism is inescapable. Congress also has the authority to pass
jurisdictional statutes, and may choose to do so on the basis of either
empirical or normative considerations, or both.75 Empirics matter a lot if
state and federal courts need to be fully fungible in order to be in parity
but less so if they merely need to be loosely comparable or exceed some
minimum level of constitutional adequacy.76 In the end, as Herman
writes:
The empirical inquiry into parity serves the normative question about when
federal court review should be made available. If one’s premise is that
federal courts should always have jurisdiction over federal constitutional
claims, regardless of state courts’ competency, then parity or disparity is
412–13 (1991); e.g., Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1115–16.
72. See Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 648–49; Martin H. Redish,
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1777–78 (1992); Wells, supra note 36, at 611; see
also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 599. See generally Bator, supra note 51.
73. Flango, supra note 54, at 973; Seinfeld, supra note 55, at 135–39. See generally Calabresi,
supra note 56.
74. See, e.g., The Statistics, 134 HARV. L. REV. 610 (2020) (containing Harvard Law Review’s
compilation of statistics on the most recent U.S. Supreme Court term). The statistics do not show how
many petitions for certiorari sought review of state court decisions, but the Court considered a total of
5,718 petitions, of which it granted review in 60. Id. at 618. Of the Court’s 149 dispositions reviewed on
writ of certiorari in October Term 2019, twenty-one of them, or 14 percent, originated in state courts. Id.
at 619–20. Of course, it is difficult to know whether the distribution of cases granted is representative of
the certiorari pool itself, but assuming it were, the Court would have reviewed approximately 800 petitions
from state court decisions. The number could be higher, given that 4,201 of the petitions considered were
filed in forma pauperis, id. at 618, and many of these are likely to have sought either direct review of state
court decisions or indirect review via federal habeas claims. Only four of those 4,201 were granted review.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and
Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1347–48 (2005); Richard Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal
Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (1988).
76. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599–600; Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259, 261–69.
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irrelevant. If one believes that federal court review is unnecessary as long
as state courts are reasonably receptive to federal constitutional claims,
then parity, in the sense of equivalence, may still not matter, but disparity
will.77

II. REBUILDING THE PARITY DEBATE—FROM ALLOCATION TO
INSTITUTIONS
The field of federal courts need not give up on parity. By changing
focus from allocational doctrine to institutional comparison, both
normative and empirical modes of analysis become newly relevant. This
Part transitions from allocation to institutions. This Part begins by
showing why the parity debate stalled on the question of empirics and
recalibrates what the field can reasonably expect from data on the courts.
Next, it pursues a close reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s latetwentieth-century allocational doctrine, showing how the earlier
allocation-focused parity debate proceeded on the mistaken assumption
that the Court based its decisions on empirics. This reading shows instead
that the Court relies on normative conceptions of state sovereignty within
our federal system. Having thus deconstructed the earlier empirics of
parity, this Part ends by rebuilding a new empirical approach. The
resulting comparative capacity model is methodologically sound,
theoretically elegant, and enables an empirics that is more responsive to
existing doctrine.
The parity debate of the 1980s and early 1990s petered out after
influential writers in the field of federal courts agreed that the parity
question was both inherently empirical and empirically intractable. This
claim was enabled by a failure to disentangle the various parity debates
from each other and examine how their differing normative claims
required different forms of empirical inquiry. In other words, parity is
not an empirical question but many empirical questions.
In 1988, Chemerinsky wrote, “I fear that the debate over parity is
permanently stalemated because parity is an empirical question—whether
one court system is as good as another—for which there can never be any
meaningful empirical measure.”78 He further noted that developing
criteria to enable measurement of such nebulous yet essential concepts as
judicial competence, decisional correctness, and institutional quality is
nearly impossible.79 Chemerinsky “question[ed] the usefulness of an
aggregate evaluation”—which he believes to be the only empirical path
forward—“of court systems as large and varied as those of fifty states and
77. Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53.
78. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 236.
79. Id. at 256–57.
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ninety-one federal districts.”80 Though he acknowledges the possibility
that some kind of sprawling project might collect data on the court
systems of individual states, he views this as a completely “different
inquiry from the current focus on parity,” which he defines as “an overall
comparison of the state court systems with the federal courts with regard
to protecting individual liberties.”81
For Chemerinsky, then, no study (or perhaps even group of studies) can
be designed to provide a conclusive empirical answer to a narrowly
tailored version of the parity question. He explains: “The problem is that
without empirical measurement, each side of the parity debate simply has
an intuitive judgment about whether the institutional differences between
federal and state courts matter in constitutional cases. Each side explains
its position, but neither has any way to prove it or refute the opposing
claim.”82 This is a remarkably positivist position for someone rejecting
the possibility of empirics altogether. It is also unusual in the context of
legal scholarship, which has established over hundreds of years a rich set
of normative, qualitative, and logical styles of argument that are widely
deployed—and widely considered rigorous and persuasive.83 This
positivist rejection of both empirical and nonempirical modes of analysis
led to a foreclosure of the parity question, causing Chemerinsky to fall
back on a “litigant choice principle” which he hoped would appeal to
“both sides” and allow a final resolution of the question of parity without
engaging, let alone relying upon, empirics.84
Redish also thinks the parity debate is over, but because it never should
have begun.85 For Redish, the factual differences between the two
systems, due to Article III, are so stark that they are self-evident and
require no systemic investigation, as if the question could even be asked
in the first place.86 Amar finds these rationales superseded by one even
more compelling: “Parity, to my mind, is not so much an empirical
question as a constitutional question. In effect, the Constitution itself
provides an answer to the empirical issue.”87
This Article instead offers normative principles to ground, rather than
end, the parity debate. The empirical assessment of parity is possible, but
80. Id. at 260.
81. Id. (emphasis in original). Chemerinsky also recognizes that a comparison between court
systems could be grounded in other substantive bodies of law and/or heads of jurisdiction.
82. Id. at 278–79. But see Bator, supra note 51, at 623 (“It is immediately apparent that these
contentions are intuitive; they rest on human insight rather than on empirical evidence or scientific
measurement. But they surely cannot be dismissed on that account.”).
83. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002).
84. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300.
85. Redish, supra note 10, at 330–31, 342.
86. Id.
87. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645; see also id. at 646.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

2021]

PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY

85

perhaps not definitively so—because no type of evidence, empirical or
otherwise, can provide a definitive answer to any complex question, with
few exceptions. An empirically-informed parity debate is likewise
possible and desirable, but the field’s expectations will have to be brought
into line with disciplinary methodological thinking. First, no one study
will definitively tell us whether or not parity exists between the state and
federal courts or any subset thereof. “[T]he debate is not susceptible to a
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, unless one is asking a very narrow version of that
question.”88 Like other careful and rigorous empirically-informed
approaches to complex questions, the empirical evidence we should look
to will consist in a body of work, with each piece making its own
contribution and likely contesting other pieces of evidence. Those
engaging in an empirically-informed parity debate should seek to make
arguments marshaling various pieces of evidence rather than obediently
looking to one study to end the conversation. (And even the most
perfectly designed study would have to be repeated later in time.)89
Second, regardless of how one conceives of parity, it cannot be
assessed without recourse to a broadly comparative body of data about
the state and federal courts as institutions. Even Neuborne’s narrow
approach required a wide-ranging factfinding mission. Additionally, the
empirical conversation cannot be limited to the federal courts literature
but must be interdisciplinary, drawing on methods, insights, and studies
from a variety of social science fields.
Third and finally, empirics alone, even so conceived, are insufficient
to answer, let alone ask, the parity question. The parity literature as a
whole has suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity. Without a nuanced
normative and doctrinal definition of what it would mean for state and
federal courts to be in parity, it is impossible to design studies that could
measure parity in any convincing way. Wells identifies the confusion as
one between “strong” and “weak” models of parity.90 Bator identifies the
stakes of the inquiry by arguing that:
The question is not, tout court, whether federal and state courts stand in
parity. The question is whether a preference for the federal forum justifies
removing to federal court all state court enforcement proceedings in which
a federal question is raised; or justifies relitigating all federal questions
already adjudicated in the state courts; or justifies separate federal litigation
of all federal defenses in injunctive or declaratory actions in the face of

88. Herman, supra note 15, at 651.
89. See Althouse, supra note 27, at 1070; Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13,
at 603; Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases between Federal and
State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1222–23 (2004); Herman, supra note 15, at 651–52; Resnik,
supra note 32, at 172; Solimine, supra note 63, at 1487. See generally Neuborne, supra note 16.
90. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
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pending or impending state court enforcement proceedings.91

Amar “suggest[s] instead that the Constitution itself has made certain
policy decisions” and thus that the need for any empirics is obviated.92
Each of these authors has committed to a differing view of parity, each
of which has its own specific implications for research design and
evaluation. Such commitments are generative; by contrast, those who
have committed to no clear and particularized model of parity have been
unable to move the conversation forward. By asking what parity might
mean for different types of people, the field becomes able to propose new
models.
A. Moving Beyond Allocation
Though earlier writers on parity found much to debate, they agreed on
one thing: the U.S. Supreme Court made its allocational decisions on the
basis of empirical assessment of the state and federal court systems. Early
participants in the parity debate often attacked the empirical factors that
were thought to inform the Court’s allocational doctrine. For example,
Neuborne argued that the Court “presently seems bent on resolving forum
allocation decisions by assuming that no factors exist which render
federal district courts more effective than state trial or appellate courts for
the enforcement of federal constitutional rights,” and that he “hope[d] to
challenge the Court’s present assumptions” by means of his empirical
discussion.93 Wells said that “[t]he Court has changed its attitude toward
and response to the gap between federal and state courts,” first ignoring
that gap, then “prefer[ring] state adjudication because of the lack of
parity.”94 Chemerinsky wrote that “the Court has repeatedly justified its
holdings by invoking conclusions about the relative competence of state
and federal courts.”95 As a result, the parity debate has been geared
toward the U.S. Supreme Court and allocational critique.96
This consensus, however, is unfounded. The Court does not now, and
did not in the 1970s and 1980s, ground its allocational judgments in
empirical assumptions or arguments. Instead, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts repeatedly used equitable discretion to establish nebulous
doctrinal principles like comity and “Our Federalism” to navigate the
fraught intergovernmental relationships of our federal system. The word
parity itself is not used in any cases that ground the parity literature. This
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Bator, supra note 51, at 610–11.
Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649.
Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117.
Wells, supra note 35, at 319–20.
Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 245.
Wells, supra note 36, at 609–10.
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Section shows that the Court’s reasoning is normative, grounded in
principles of federalism and judicial administration, rather than empirical.
Removing this fundamental ground of the parity debate has at least two
major implications. First, federal courts scholars should reconsider their
reliance on empirically-inflected critiques of the Court’s allocational
doctrine, unless the aim of the critique is to undertake the much larger
task of convincing the Court to change the epistemological basis of its
allocational jurisprudence. Empirical arguments about the relative
competence of state and federal fora are much better addressed elsewhere,
such as when federal district court judges are deciding habeas or
abstention claims. Second, the empirics of parity must go beyond steering
filing decisions under particular conditions of concurrency. Accepting
the jurisdictional framework as a given, or at least, as susceptible only to
normative and doctrinal critiques, the field must understand, empirically,
how this framework has structured all substantive dimensions of the
relationship between the state and federal courts: in particular, where
doctrine positions federal courts as coming into play only when state
courts, individually or collectively, have failed in some way, and where
the substantive law of one kind of government crosses forum boundaries,
to be heard in the courts of the other kind of government.
Stone v. Powell was an inflection point in the development of the
allocational relationship between state and federal courts, as the Burger
Court constrained the Warren Court’s expansive approach to federal
jurisdiction. Neuborne critiqued the decision as reflecting a naïve
“assum[ption] that state and federal courts are functionally
interchangeable forums likely to provide equivalent protection for federal
constitutional rights.”97 But Stone itself holds only that “where the State
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”98 Stone required only an
opportunity for litigation of the federal constitutional claim—not a
guarantee that the state court would necessarily find in favor of the
plaintiff or that the result would be the same (one way or the other) in
state as in federal court.
Indeed, the Stone Court recognized that the police likely obtained the
evidence in question in a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.99
Given that the opinion does not rule out the possibility that the state court
completely failed to vindicate a valid constitutional claim, but nonetheless
holds that the habeas petitioner did have a “full and fair opportunity” to
97. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105.
98. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
99. Id. at 481–82, 490–95.
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litigate that claim, the Court at best endorses “weak parity” here rather
than, as Neuborne reads it, asserting “functional interchangeab[ility].”
Stone hardly “celebrate[s]” parity.100 Rather, it essentially asserts that
state courts must be trusted to resolve most Fourth Amendment issues
correctly most of the time. But Neuborne’s analysis seems to have
skewed the parity debate. Subsequent commentators have continued to
treat Stone as an empirically-based decision.
The abstention cases similarly show the Court’s reliance on normative
equitable principles. Thinking about parity in terms of abstention reveals
that the litigant choice principle is at best a partial solution to the problem.
As the Court noted in Mitchum v. Foster, the statutory language of the
Anti-Injunction Act101 could have formed the basis of the decision as to
whether or not to abstain in Younger v. Harris, but instead “the Court
carefully eschewed any reliance on the statute in reversing the judgment,
basing its decision instead upon what the Court called ‘Our
Federalism[.]’”102 A much earlier abstention case, Railroad Comm’n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., used similar language. As the Pullman Court
noted, earlier cases “reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our
federal system whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion,
restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the
federal judiciary.”103 In these abstention cases, litigants, under conditions
of concurrency, have properly chosen to file in federal courts—and have
been rebuffed, because the federal forum has chosen to “further[] the
harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need
of rigorous congressional restriction of [equitable] powers” by sending
the case to another proper forum.104
The abstention cases provide important, and contradictory, teachings
about parity. First, litigant choice is not dispositive.105 Second, federal
courts focus on system-level, normative concerns in an effort to preserve
the proper relationship between state and federal sovereigns. Such
100. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948).
102. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972).
103. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
104. Id. This phenomenon again casts doubt on Chemerinsky’s litigant-choice solution to the parity
problem, echoing Redish’s question: “[W]hat are we to do if the different litigants wish to choose different
forums?” Redish, supra note 72, at 1778.
105. By definition, the major abstention cases arose because one side wanted to be in federal court,
and the other side wanted the case to remain in state court. Again, Bator’s caution that “[t]he limitations,
too, count as setting forth constitutional values” is apt. Bator, supra note 51, at 631. The reservation
procedures established in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam., 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964),
exemplify this tension. A litigant may lose an abstention fight in federal court, be sent back to state court
against her will, and then, if she fails to make an appropriate England reservation, will not be able to
return to federal court due to res judicata issues.
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decisions do not rest on particularized empirical determinations about the
two fora. In fact, these philosophical concerns can be overridden not by
proving simply that state and federal courts are not in strict parity, but
only by showing that state courts are unusually deficient.106 Third,
however, and contrary to the Court’s explicit language, federal courts’
exercise of equitable discretion is potentially linked to an implicit judicial
factfinding as to whether there are grounds for suspicion of the state
court’s willingness or ability to enforce federal rights under the
circumstances.107 The Court’s opinion in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States exemplifies these contradictions,
holding that the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to
exercise their jurisdiction inasmuch as abstention “is the exception, not
the rule,” and also abstention is appropriate in a host of situations where
states simply have a strong interest in hearing the case in their own
courts.108 Colorado River both recognizes the primacy of federal
jurisdiction where lawful and encourages the federal courts to defer to the
state courts for reasons of respect for state sovereignty, without
contending that the state courts are equally competent. In other words,
Colorado River—decided in the same year as Stone v. Powell—is not at
all concerned with parity in the “strong” sense of the term.
As with abstention, the empirical question of parity seems almost
irrelevant to habeas jurisprudence in the twenty-first century. After the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 109 and
a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions further narrowing the scope of
review and relief under AEDPA, federal courts now ask only whether
state-court proceedings either “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”110 A state-court decision is only “contrary to” precedent if
it is completely “opposite” to the conclusion “reached by [the Supreme]
Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and
arrives at a result opposite to [the Court’s].”111 Together, Congress and

106. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454
(1974).
107. See, e.g., Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238–42.
108. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976).
109. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (1996).
111. Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000).
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the Court have created a doctrine that does not rely on traditional
considerations of parity in empowering state courts to make near-final
determinations of constitutional rights. As a normative and positive
matter, state courts need not even be comparable to, let alone
“functionally interchangeable” with, federal courts in how they might
decide the constitutional issues raised by habeas petitioners; they need
only to reach results not “diametrically different” from how the U.S.
Supreme Court has decided a particular issue.112 If this can be considered
parity, it is the weakest version possible.
Amar was right. As a doctrinal matter, “the Constitution itself has
made certain policy decisions,” and along with Congress’ jurisdictional
statutes and the Supreme Court’s interpretive decisions, it “provides every
bit as much of an answer on the wider [allocational] question as it does
on the narrower question of whether state courts are constitutionally
adequate to hear federal questions in the first instance.”113 Forty years
into the parity debate, it seems clear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
strongly normative approach to allocational issues relies mainly on a
sense that state courts, as the judicial branches of coequal sovereigns,
ought to be accorded respect in their determinations even if a federal court
would likely come out quite differently on a particular question.
At the highest levels of scale, jurisdictional design does not presume
parity—let alone interchangeability—between state and federal courts at
the initial point of adjudication. Rather, the design aims to ensure a
modicum of federal supervisory power over state decisions if they seem
extraordinarily wrong. The empirical implications are clear: the primary
doctrinal question susceptible of empirical inquiry is whether state courts
are meeting a constitutional baseline of competence; federal district
courts may have some degree of latitude, under the guise of equitable
discretion, to consider facts about state-court competence; and Congress
is a better target of allocational critique than the Court, as it conceivably
could change jurisdictional statutes on the basis of different legislative
factfinding.
B. Parity as Comparative Capacity
1. The Old Empirics of Parity: Methodological and Normative Problems
Federal courts scholars approaching parity empirically have done so in
a thinly positivist manner.114 For these scholars, the parity question can
112. Id.
113. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645, 647.
114. By contrast, see generally Rubenstein, supra note 42. Rubenstein’s empirics of personal
experience provide a richer comparative understanding of state and federal courts than do many of the
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be answered definitively in one study,115 or at most a small handful of
studies, relying on a strong conception of parity that can therefore be
measured by comparing outcomes in the two systems. 116 Such studies
expressly limit themselves to constitutional rights enforcement, staying
within the contours (unintentionally) established by Neuborne.117 Some
of these studies have made use of advocates’ views on federal and state
court systems but have claimed that these are valid indicia of the
characteristics of the court systems themselves, rather than a separate,
albeit related, body of data.118 Most samples in empirical parity studies
seem to be of convenience or, at best, weakly motivated.119 The analysis
of outcomes data uses only basic descriptive statistics.120 Such forays into
empiricism have not satisfied more doctrinally-minded federal courts
scholars.121
The methodological weaknesses of these studies are obvious, their
theoretical problems less so. In relying uncritically on a “strong” theory
of parity without asking how the meaning and implications of parity shift
depending on one’s vantage point, such studies use empiricism to
foreclose, rather than open up, the parity conversation. Instead, this
Section argues that different models of parity that seem, at first, to be in
opposition can be true simultaneously. “Strong parity” may be how
litigants strategize where they are likeliest to win.122 But litigants may
also care about securing “weak” forms of parity in terms of fairness of
process as a minimum.123
In this way, the attempt to advance the litigant-choice model as a means
of escaping the orientation toward outcomes reveals itself to be
misguided.124 On what basis will litigants choose where to file their
more systematized empirical studies of parity coming out of the federal courts field.
115. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214–15; Gerry, supra note 40, at 237–38;
Marvell, supra note 41, at 1338–39.
116. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 226, 232; Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127 (1989).
117. See, e.g., Gerry, supra note 40, at 237; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214.
118. Marvell, supra note 41, at 1338–39; Flango, supra note 54, at 973–74. The reception history
of Neuborne’s The Myth of Parity is perhaps the best example of this tendency.
119. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 524; Marvell, supra note 41, at 1343–44; Solimine &
Walker, supra note 43, at 238. Cf. Gerry, supra note 40, at 238.
120. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 238–39 n.118; id. at 239–246.
121. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 261–69.
122. Compare Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300–01, with Amar, Parity as
a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649.
123. See Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53. But see Neuborne, supra note 16, at 803.
124. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300–01; see also Amar, Parity as a
Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649; Bator, supra note 51, at 631–32; Redish, supra note 72, at
1778 (“Perhaps a greater problem with the free market rationale for litigant choice is the fact that
competing litigants may have contradictory, or at least different, interests to be served in choosing a forum.
For example, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a federal right may prefer a federal forum because of its more
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claims if not on a sense of competitive advantage? The litigant-choice
framework enables academics to avoid taking an empirically-informed
comparative position, but it does not allow a litigant to do likewise. By
contrast, for system-level decisionmakers—namely, members of
Congress and the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court—and academic
theorists, fairness of judging, or “weak” parity, becomes more
determinative as one approaches a level of scale at which individual wins
and losses recede in importance.125 Weak parity matters when allocating
classes of cases; strong parity matters when it’s your own case at stake.
The two models are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they coexist, but they
address themselves to different decisionmakers.
2. The New Empirics of Parity
A comparative-capacity model of parity both encompasses and
explains the parity debate’s focus on the assertion of particular federal
rights in state courts. The orientation toward comparative capacity is
inspired by Neuborne, who framed his model as an “assess[ment of] the
relative institutional capacity of state and federal courts to enforce
constitutional doctrine.”126 But the model proposed here goes beyond
Neuborne. It situates parity as conceptually encompassing the entire
landscape of concurrency and boundary-crossing—all claims that could
be brought in either state or federal court. It deliberately includes forum
choices at the beginning of the litigation (as in § 1983 or diversity cases)
and cases that move from one system to the other depending on the
progress of the litigation (as in habeas or abstention). The question of
parity takes on particular salience where allocational doctrine explicitly
sets up a comparison between, or contemplates a complementary role for,
state and federal courts, and where facts on the ground seem to
differentiate the state and federal court systems. Such “parity hot spots”
are not static but change over time as allocational doctrine evolves and as
practical realities—the politics of the courts, the makeup of the judiciary,
and so forth—shift.
Pace Neuborne, this Section proposes three major reasons why parity
hot spots may or may not emerge. First, as a threshold matter, allocational
law creates affordances for parity to become relevant. Where litigants
may choose to file in either state or federal court, the strategic litigant will
attempt to determine where she will have an advantage. Where
elaborate procedural mechanisms, shorter dockets, and greater sensitivity to federal rights. For a mirror
image of the exact same reasons, however, the defendant in the same case may prefer a state forum.”);
Wells, supra note 36, at 611.
125. See Wells, supra note 36, at 610–11; see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 38.
126. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1118.
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allocational doctrine simply does not allow for concurrency—for
example, individuals charged with state crimes have no choice but to
appear in state court—parity is irrelevant.127 Without a doctrinal
framework allowing for overlap between court systems, the question of
parity is meaningless.
Second, certain areas of jurisdictional overlap draw heightened
scrutiny under conditions of fact that make the choice of state versus
federal court particularly salient. For example, the statutes and doctrines
around habeas make the question of the adequacy of state court
proceedings salient in the first place;128 state judges face additional
practical pressures to decide against criminal defendants in election years
when the public expects a “tough on crime” approach, perhaps creating
timeframes in which state courts are more likely to be hostile and even
constitutionally deficient.129 One might also imagine that § 1983 cases
alleging police brutality, say, might fare differently in local state and
federal courts depending on public opinion regarding crime and issues of
racial inequality. State court judges facing reelection in years when the
public is more concerned with crime may be more favorable to police;
however, in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, it is
conceivable that the reverse might become true.130 In short, where there
is more at stake for judges when they decide for or against a certain type
of litigant, areas of mere doctrinal concurrency become central sites of
the parity debate.
Third, questions of parity may arise because litigants themselves feel—
justifiably or not—that there are differences that matter between state and
federal courts. Recent developments in class action and diversity
jurisdiction are particularly instructive. Though the parity debate has
primarily focused on the viability of federal claims in state court, state
causes of action in federal courts present much the same set of questions.
127. At least as a matter of initial forum choice, though they may seek injunctions or habeas review
in federal court.
128. See supra Part II(a).
129. See, e.g., Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on
Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107 (2007); Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime,
Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT.
741 (2013); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jason P. Kelly, Judicial Selection and Death Penalty
Decisions, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (2014); Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the
Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360 (2008).
130. Public opinion on contested issues seems to drive the decision-making of elected judges. See
supra note 129. By contrast, where issues are less salient in the public discourse, elected judges are more
independent. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Amy Semet, Judicial Elections, Public
Opinion, and Decisions on Lower-Salience Issues, 15 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 672 (2018) (showing that
public opinion on environmental law, a low-salience issue, has little impact on judicial decision-making).
Parity may be equally at stake with regard to both environmental law and criminal law, but a “hot spot,”
where the independence of judges becomes at issue, may be more likely to emerge when the public pays
attention.
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Prior to 2005, class actions based on state law could be brought in state
court, or in federal court if complete diversity was present.131 In that year,
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which,
among other reforms, extended federal diversity jurisdiction to class
actions in which there is only minimal diversity (provided some other
conditions are met).132
Though much more could be said about CAFA, what is important here
is that corporate litigants perceived state and federal courts not to be in
parity, at least regarding class actions, and were able to formalize this
preference through legislation.133 Preexisting doctrine in the realm of
diversity jurisdiction provided for rough but imperfect concurrency;
CAFA intervened to channel a much larger subset of state-law class action
claims to federal court. Contrary to many parity commentators’ belief
that the federal courts are more plaintiff-friendly, in the class action realm,
defense and plaintiffs’ bars alike believed state courts to be preferable for
plaintiffs and federal courts for defendants.134 This reveals that parity
needs to be assessed anew in each doctrinal area.
For this reason, the comparative capacity model encompasses the
existing parity debate and also goes beyond this narrow doctrinal context.
The question of constitutional rights may be regarded as but one of the
“hot spots” that lie at the intersection of doctrinal affordance, political
salience, and litigant perception of competitive advantage. One might
also update the old parity debate by considering how the assertion of
constitutional rights has changed since Neuborne originally wrote.
Litigants on the political right increasingly bring claims under a new
constellation of constitutional rights.135 Even when cabined to its original
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996).
132. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. CAFA’s changes
to the diversity statute included, inter alia: defining class actions to include removed actions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(1)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2); increasing the amount in controversy requirement to $5 million
and permitting aggregation of multiple plaintiffs’ claims to reach this amount, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
(d)(6); instituting minimal as opposed to complete diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
133. David Marcus highlights the continuity between CAFA and the earlier debate over diversity
jurisdiction leading up to Erie. In the early twentieth century, Marcus writes, “[M]any lawyers believed
that the federal judiciary as a whole harbored procorporate, antiregulatory tendencies that limited the reach
of state law.” Similarly, “CAFA supporters hope that this federalization of multistate class actions will
result in fewer certified classes and thereby relieve defendants of liability of state law causes of action.
Their faith in the statute rests on what they perceive to be an emergent hostility in the federal courts toward
multistate class actions that allege state law causes of action.” David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action
Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247,
1252 (2007).
134. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008).
135. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, A New (Republican) Litigation State?, 11 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 657 (2021). See also, e.g., John Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Second(-Class) Amendment:
The Supreme Court Should Put Gun Rights on the Same Level as Other Constitutional Requirements,
NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/supreme-court-second-
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doctrinal context, the parity debate can no longer treat all constitutional
plaintiffs alike. Instead, what is required from the twenty-first-century
perspective is a sensitivity to what Bator has called the “hidden
assumption[s] of the argument”—“that the Constitution contains only one
or two sorts of values: typically, those which protect the individual from
the power of the state, and those which assure the superiority of federal
to state law,” and to the “other sorts of values” that the Constitution
contains, both granting power to the federal government and confining
this power.136 Now more than ever, “[t]he limitations, too, count as
setting forth constitutional values.”137 A contemporary approach to
constitutional parity cannot stop with win rates but must look to how state
and federal judges think about the subtle boundaries of constitutional
rights, especially where rights come into conflict.138
The parity debate is not singular and cannot be decided by a single
empirical metric, no matter how robust the study design or how
significant the results. Rather, parity has to be assessed by recourse to a
broad set of institutional characteristics and a similarly broad ecosystem
of actors—as exemplified by disciplinary approaches to the study of the
courts.139 Even if one begins by theorizing parity narrowly, it is
impossible to proceed without drawing in factors that are equally
applicable to broader definitions. For example, Solimine and Walker’s
much-criticized study, which explicitly centered outcomes as of nearexclusive importance, had also to assess case type, right asserted, aspects
of the case’s procedural posture, various characteristics of judges, and

amendment-rights/ (prominent conservatives call to reinvigorate gun rights litigation with the hope that
Justice Kavanaugh will be receptive to expanding the scope of the Second Amendment); see also Janus
v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (exemplifying one of the most prominent contemporary
cases using the First Amendment to advance a right-wing, anti-union agenda); Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns,
Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
887 (2011). The Covid-19 pandemic has provided the latest opportunity for right-wing constitutional
rights innovation. See, e.g., Clare Lombardo, Indiana University’s Vaccine Requirement Should Stand,
Federal
Judge
Rules,
NPR
(July
19,
2021,
6:51
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/19/1018010489/indiana-universitys-vaccine-requirement-should-standfederal-judge-rules; Ilya Somin, A Takings Clause Lawsuit Against the CDC Eviction Moratorium, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 3, 2021, 10:20 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/08/03/a-takingsclause-lawsuit-against-the-cdc-eviction-moratorium/. But see Rubenstein, supra note 42.
136. Bator, supra note 51, at 631–32.
137. Id. (emphasis removed).
138. In Burt Neuborne’s 1995 article Parity Revisited, Neuborne suggests that the increasing
conservatism of the federal courts more or less puts an end to the parity debate. Neuborne, supra note 16.
However, this development merely shifts the terrain, generally in line with Paul Bator’s perspective on
this point. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
139. But see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (1997) (“To date, legal scholarship has been
remarkably oblivious to this large and mounting body of political science scholarship on courts. Some
political scientists have been correspondingly unconscious of the legal model.”).
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some strategic considerations of litigants.140 Or take Neuborne’s single
heuristic of “judicial competence.” Any attempt to understand the
concept of “competence” opens out onto a host of considerations such as
insulation from majoritarian pressure,141 prestige,142 selectiveness,143
salary,144 time management,145 clerk quality,146 and the social classes of
each type of judge.147 No matter the theoretical point of departure, the
empirical assessment of parity inevitably moves toward institutional
comparisons encompassing many parameters; the scope of such
comparison changes only by level of scale.
It is also critical that any empirical approach to the parity debates
account for how different actors affect each other. The U.S. Supreme
Court interprets congressional statutes but also sets the tone for the kind
of legislation Congress might consider enacting; Congress creates
frameworks of concurrency that create the terrain on which litigants make
strategic choices but is also subject to litigant lobbies; the Court shapes
new law based on the experiences and arguments of individual litigants
who come before it who may not be served well by the lived reality of the
court systems in which their concerns are heard. For example, one might
ask with regard to CAFA how business litigants, in the aggregate,
influenced Congress to make these particular allocational decisions.148
Finally, empirical and normative considerations vary in salience to
different actors. As this article has shown thus far, empirics matter very
little, in the end, to many actors—such as the U.S. Supreme Court. The
claim here is not that empirics put the parity debates to rest, but rather that
they provide new ground for expanding the set of conversations around
the comparative affordances of the state and federal courts.
III. EVALUATING COMPARATIVE CAPACITY: DATA AND METHODS ON THE
COURTS AS INSTITUTIONS
This Part surveys empirical research on state and federal courts and the
140. Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 236–52. See in particular, id. at 238 n.118 (listing
thirteen coded variables). See also supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
141. Bator, supra note 51, at 623; Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 275.
142. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 276; Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1120–
21.
143. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1121.
144. Id.
145. Bator, supra note 51, at 623; Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1121, 1124.
146. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1122.
147. Id. at 1124.
148. For an examination of the legislative and lobbying history of the Class Action Fairness Act,
see, e.g., Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2005); Stephen P. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical
Context: A Preliminary View of the Statute’s Legal Significance, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).
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tools and methods available to extend this research. It also identifies
aspects of the parity debate where the empirics really do seem intractable
or at least not useful. Any model of parity must identify institutional
parameters of interest. This Part follows Neuborne in considering judicial
competence, “psychological set,” and attorney demographics. Extending
Neuborne, it adds a broader concept of judicial psychology and decisionmaking and an analysis of court resources and public trust and confidence
in the courts.
In the attempt to review a vast literature, editorial decisions were
inevitable. And this Part’s working definition of “the empirical literature”
is catholic. Given the model of parity as a multitude of debates operating
at different levels of scale, this Part likewise offers data right-sized to
each, from systemic quantitative information to local case studies,
personal reflections, to analyses of case outcomes. In short, it follows
Lee Epstein and Gary King’s view of data as “just a term for facts about
the world,” which may be “precise or vague, relatively certain or very
uncertain, directly observed or indirect proxies, and they can be
anthropological, interpretive, sociological, economic, legal, political,
biological, physical, or natural.”149 In so doing, this synthesis recognizes
some legal scholarship as “empirical” that may not self-identify as such;
under the Epstein and King definition, most legal scholars are already
doing empirical work.150 But the inclusion of a given study is not
necessarily an endorsement.
This survey mainly encompasses disciplinary empirical work on the
courts—from political science, economics, and psychology, among
others. But the intended audience is primarily federal courts scholars,
who could draw on this empirical work to make and critique the kinds of
doctrinal and historical arguments most common in the field of federal
courts. The analysis begins with data on judges—the individuals within
court systems who hold the most power and therefore draw the most
attention—and how they do their work. From judges themselves, we
move to the objects and products of their labor: cases and their outcomes,
including data on case complexity, docket composition, substantive legal
issues, and judicial workload. This literature, when considered
collectively, begins to outline what Neuborne and others think of as
“judicial competence.”151 Such data contextualize outcomes-oriented
research.
This Part then collects empirical data on attorneys and litigants—a
comparatively less-studied area that is crucial to developing a proper
149. Epstein & King, supra note 83, at 2–3.
150. Id. at 3.
151. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial competence in the
context of the earlier parity debate.
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empirics of the litigant-choice principle. In furthering a more expansive
view of the courts as institutions, this Part assesses the wide array of data
that the state and federal court systems collect in order to monitor and
improve their own performance. It finishes by evaluating the place of the
courts in the public sphere. Such institutional metrics provide a
foundation for what is ultimately the most important comparative
normative project on the courts: the development of a model of court
quality that can be applied to both state and federal courts with the aim of
enhancing the capacity of both court systems to serve litigants, the law,
and the public. This Part concludes with reflections on gaps in the
available data and practical considerations for future comparative
research.
A. Judges as the Central Actors and Objects of Analysis
1. Judicial Demographics
By far the largest body of empirical data on the courts focuses on
judges on the assumption152 that they are the most critical players in the
system.153 Who are judges? Our judiciary is far less diverse than the
communities it serves, and the full effect of this discrepancy is not yet
known. Though the diversity of federal judges is improving somewhat,154
the state judiciary remains overwhelmingly white and male.155
Comprehensive demographic information about both federal and state
judges is readily available—in raw form,156 and accompanied by
152. An assumption that seems reasonable but is untested.
153. A note about the citations in Part III.A: Because the literature on judges and judicial labor is
so vast, there is simply not space to list all the bibliographic sources this author finds relevant. This author
has selected those that are either most representative of the scope of the literature, most recent in time,
most seminal, most comprehensive, or most squarely on point, with a bias toward articles appearing in
disciplinary journals that may not be as frequently read in the legal academy, and to encourage interested
readers to dive further into the literature.
154. Barry J. McMillion, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT
JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS (2017).
155. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, THE GAVEL
GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 2–3 (2016), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/gavel-gap-report.pdf. For interactive data, see Tracey E. George and Albert H.
Yoon, Gavel Gap, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/gavel-gap/
(last visited Aug. 1, 2021).
156. See Attributes of U.S. Federal Judges Database, THE JUD. RSCH. INITIATIVE (JURI) AT THE
UNIV. OF S.C., http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2021);
Demography
of
Article
III
Judges,
1789–2017,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/demography-article-iii-judges-1789-2017introduction (last visited Aug. 1, 2021). See also Judicial Diversity: A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/judicial-diversity-0, Sept. 12, 2017 (last visited Aug.
1, 2021); Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal Judiciary,
CENTER
FOR
AMERICAN
PROGRESS,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts
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sophisticated analysis.157 In particular, Tracey George and Albert Yoon’s
groundbreaking work on the “Gavel Gap” in the state judiciary—the
difference in diversity between a given state’s judiciary and its
population—highlights the relationship between a judge’s identity and
her decisions.158 The project aggregates data on every individual state
judge, allowing for nuanced comparison. Gender influences case
outcomes and panel dynamics.159 And judicial nominees’ prior
professional experience is increasingly homogeneous.160 This work
primarily focuses on U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate court
appointees, but the research questions and methods could be extended to
federal district and state court judges. Salary information, which some
commentators have indicated may affect whether qualified lawyers seek
to become judges,161 is readily accessible online.162 Finally, detailed
biographical and financial information is available in raw form via federal
judges’ nomination papers.163
2. Judicial Training
The literature contains somewhat less information about how judges
develop their substantive legal knowledge, orient their decision-making,
and interact with others in the court system. We know little about whether
judicial training is effective and how it could be improved. The question
of training is intimately linked with the concept of judicial competence.

/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). But see
Judicial Officer (JO) Demographic Data, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/13418.htm (last visited
Aug. 1, 2021).
157. See McMillion, supra note 154; George & Yoon, THE GAVEL GAP, supra note 155.
158. George & Yoon, Gavel Gap, supra note 155.
159. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010).
160. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and
Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903 (2003); Lee
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, & Jeffrey A. Segal, Circuit Effects: How the Norm of
Federal Judicial Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009); Benjamin H.
Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137
(2012).
161. See supra notes 60 and 144, and accompanying text.
162. See Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/judicial-salaries-us-district-court-judges (last visited Aug. 8, 2021);
Judicial Salary Tracker, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/salarytracker (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021).
163. See Judicial Nominations, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
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The Federal Judicial Center164 and the National Center for State Courts165
publicize information about the curricula and training programs they offer
for sitting judges, which include everything from ethics and evidentiary
decision-making to the practicalities of running trials and maintaining
courtroom security. Some of this training is oriented toward changing a
judge’s personal affect—for example, reducing implicit bias.166 However,
the efficacy of such interventions has been questioned.167
3. Judicial Selection Processes and Their Effects
The earlier parity debate often emphasized that federal judges168 are
appointed for life, whereas state judges are often elected or subject to
electoral recall. Many scholars believed that elections made it hard for
state judges to enforce federal rights, especially unpopular ones. For
some, the disparity between systems was so obvious as not to be worth
discussion;169 for others, the question was live and as yet unanswered;170
and for still others, the question was, very pragmatically, moot given state
judges’ constitutional obligation to enforce federal law, and given that the
vast majority of litigation in the United States takes place before state
judges.171 Four decades later, we know that the process of judicial
selection influences subsequent decision-making and now seek to
understand precisely how that influence works.172 And it is understood
that the federal appointment process, too, shapes what later happens on
the bench.173

164. See, e.g., Programs and Resources for Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/education/programs-and-resources-judges (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); Manuals,
Monographs, & Guides, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/education/manuals-monographsguides (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT: 2020,
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/34/Federal%20Judicial%20Center%20Annual%20Repo
rt%202020.pdf; Federal and State Court Cooperation: Effectiveness of Implicit Bias Trainings, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/337738/effectiveness-implicit-bias-trainings (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021).
165. See, e.g., Areas of Expertise, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Servicesand-Experts/Areas-of-expertise.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
166. See Effectiveness of Implicit Bias Trainings, supra note 164.
167. Elizabeth Thornburg, (Un)conscious Judging, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019).
168. The debate has primarily addressed Article III judges, setting aside magistrate judges,
bankruptcy judges, ALJs, and so forth, all of whom should properly be included in any comprehensive
study. See Resnik, supra note 32, at 174.
169. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 15.
171. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also George & Yoon, supra note 155, at 3
(“State courts handle more than 90% of the judicial business in America.”).
172. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV. 929
(2016).
173. See infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.
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Selection and election processes vary not only between the state and
federal systems as a whole but among the states too. (Thus, though the
earlier parity debate contrasted elected state judges as a group with
appointed federal judges as a group,174 it is important to take account of
how variations in selection and election processes among the states may
change the nature of the comparison.) The historical development and
variety of state appointment and election models have been thoroughly
mapped and analyzed.175 Judicial elections are now more visible and
politicized than ever before.176 And there is a lively critical debate as to
which system is best; though there is some consensus that appointed and
life-tenured judiciaries are more independent, there are notable dissenters,
many of whom also question whether complete independence from the
voting public is desirable.177
174. See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text.
175. For systemic data and analysis, see Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Project Overview, STATE
SUPREME COURT DATA PROJECT, http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/index.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021); Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the
Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 243 (2001); see also Jeff Yates, On the
Future of State Courts Research, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 302 (2009).
For comparative and particularized studies, see, e.g., PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH:
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1980); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin,
What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987); Melinda
Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections,
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20 (2006); Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing the
State Courts of Last Resort through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2006); James L. Gibson,
Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign Speech?, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 899 (2008);
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Politics of Judicial Opposition, 166 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 88 (2010); CanesWrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence and Retention Elections, 28 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 211 (2012); Ryan J. Owens, Alexander Tahk, Patrick C. Wohlfarth & Amanda C. Bryan,
Nominating Commissions, Judicial Retention, and Forward-Looking Behavior on State Supreme Courts:
An Empirical Examination of Selection and Retention Methods, 15 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 211 (2015);
CHRIS W. BONNEAU & DAMON M. CANN, VOTERS’ VERDICTS: CITIZENS, CAMPAIGNS, AND
INSTITUTIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015).
But see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure
of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965 (2007).
These studies also have some implications for judge competence or quality, see, e.g., Stephen
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluation and Information Forcing: Ranking State High
Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L. J. 1313, 1319 (2009); Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit
Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67 (2009); Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance,
12 JUST. SYS. J. 148 (1987); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities That Make a “Good”
Judge, 462 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 112 (1982).
Scholars have noted that the development of the elected judiciary is historically contingent,
precipitated, perhaps, by economic anxiety and a desire to strengthen the power of the judiciary as against
a corrupt legislature. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010).
176. See RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT
(2015).
177. Compare studies arguing against judicial elections and for a greater degree of independence,
e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
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Money matters—it helps to determine who is elected and how they
decide cases.178 Voters pay attention to a small number of high-salience
issues like crime179 and torts,180 and comparatively less attention to lowsalience issues like environmental law.181 For example, scholars report a
direct relationship between the number of television ads aired drawing
attention to incumbents’ decisions in criminal cases and those judges’
decisions in subsequent criminal cases; ads uniformly make judges
“tougher on crime.”182 Campaign contributions from business interests
strongly predict favorable judicial decisions.183 And these effects are

L. REV. 689 (1995); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems,
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7 (2001); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 43 (2003); JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections,
114 MICH. L. REV. 929 (2016); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265
(2008) with those arguing in favor of a greater degree of majoritarian responsiveness, e.g., CHRIS W.
BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009); Eric A. Posner, Does
Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter? Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal Reform, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 853, 855 (2008); Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
290, 290 (2010); Lee Epstein, Electoral Benefits: The Assault on the Assaulters of Judicial Elections,
96 JUDICATURE 218 (2013).
For comparative and reflective studies of selection systems, see Larry T. Aspin & William K.
Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306 (1994) (surveying judges who had
faced retention elections, finding a high degree of support for the process); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There
a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Lee Epstein,
Shedding (Empirical) Light on Judicial Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 563 (2009); G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT
FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES (2012);
James L. Gibson, Electing Judges: Future Research and the Normative Debate About Judicial Elections,
96 JUDICATURE 223 (2013); Lawrence Baum, Supreme Court Elections: How Much They Have Changed,
Why They Have Changed, and What Differences It Makes, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 900 (2017).
178. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625
(2009); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of
Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2011). Compare Joshua B.
Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers? Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with
Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S269 (2015).
179. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI 247 (2004); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The
Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107 (2007); Carlos Berdejó
& Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal
Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741 (2013); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jason P. Kelly,
Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (2014).
180. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999).
181. Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark, & Amy Semet, Judicial Elections, Public Opinion, and
Decisions on Lower-Salience Issues, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 672 (2018).
182. See JOANNA SHEPHERD & MICHAEL S. KANG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, SKEWED
JUSTICE: CITIZENS UNITED, TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES’
DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (2014), https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/skewed-justice/ (last
visited Aug. 8, 2021). But see MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN
ADVERTISING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015).
183. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The
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magnified where judges run in partisan elections.184
Elections affect more than case outcomes;185 they influence judges’
reasoning186 (but not necessarily writing style187) and public interactions
with the courts. Elections also influence the public legitimacy of the state
court system,188 and even citizens’ litigiousness.189 The structure and
incentives of elections also affect voting behavior and public engagement
with the election process.190 But it is not only elected judges who are
affected by public opinion and partisan influence.191 The political party
of the official who appoints a judge correlates with the partisan slant of
that judge’s decision-making.192 And appointed judges are susceptible to
influence by outside parties.193
The literature on judicial paths to the bench is methodologically
sophisticated, bringing to bear quantitative techniques from political
Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015); LAWRENCE BAUM, DAVID KLEIN, & MATTHEW J. STREB, THE BATTLE FOR
THE COURT: INTEREST GROUPS, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2017).
184. See Kang & Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts, supra note 183; see also, e.g.,
Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and Vote Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan
Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 43 (2015).
185. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD.
169 (2009).
186. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and
Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1207 (1997); Brandice Canes-Wrone & Kenneth
W. Shotts, When Do Elections Encourage Ideological Rigidity?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 273 (2007); Kirk
A. Randazzo, Richard W. Waterman, & Michael P. Fix, State Supreme Courts and the Effects of Statutory
Constraint: A Test of the Model of Contingent Discretion, 64 POL. RES. Q. 779 (2011). For normative
perspectives, see, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012).
187. Greg Goelzhauser & Damon M. Cann, Judicial Independence and Opinion Clarity on State
Supreme Courts, 14 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 123 (2014).
188. See JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY (2012).
189. Jeff Yates, Holley Tankersley, & Paul Brace, Assessing the Impact of State Judicial Structures
on Citizen Litigiousness, 63 POL. RES. Q. 796 (2010).
190. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Voting in State Supreme Court Elections: Competition and
Context as Democratic Incentives, 69 J. POL. 1147 (2007); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau,
Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457 (2008); Matthew J. Streb, Brian Frederick & Casey LaFrance, Voter Rolloff in a
Low-Information Context: Evidence from Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 37 AM. POL. RES. 644
(2009).
191. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589 (2009).
192. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998); Mark J.
McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal
Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q. 799 (2012); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush
v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (2016).
193. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 72 (2005). But see Jenna Becker Kane, Lobbying Justice(s)? Exploring the Nature of Amici Influence
in State Supreme Court Decision Making, 17 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 251 (2017).
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science and econometrics194 and comprising both aggregated data on the
state courts as a whole and on individual states.195 Still, those seeking to
understand the effect of judicial selection and election processes on parity,
especially from the litigant or local perspective, would benefit from data
and analysis with a granular focus on particular states.
4. Judicial Decision-making as Process
Empiricists have also sought to understand, from multiple disciplinary
perspectives, the process of judicial decision-making itself—the
influence of external factors as well as processes intrinsic to the judge.196
This literature illuminates what was earlier called “psychological set.”
Indeed, scholarship on judicial decision-making offers a more nuanced
consideration of how case outcomes come to be and whether two facially
identical outcomes are indeed equivalent.197
Political scientists have created a variety of models to understand the
judicial mind.198 The attitudinal model posits that a judge evaluates the
facts and arguments of the case before her against her preexisting attitudes
and commitments—most often, political.199 Originally developed based
on U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the attitudinal model has been applied to
the state judiciary,200 allowing cross-systemic comparisons. It has been

194. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Law in Election Cases, 70 VAND.
L. REV. 1755, 1761 (2017); Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences
of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 387 (2000); Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, Designing
Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197, 205 (2004); Melinda
Gann Hall, The Controversy Over Electing Judges and Advocacy in Political Science, 30 JUST. SYS. J.
284, 287 (2009).
195. Compare Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from
the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995) with, e.g., Andrew J. Clopton & C. Scott Peters, Justices
Denied: A Count-Level Analysis of the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court Retention Election, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 321
(2013); John D. Echeverria, State Judicial Elections and Environmental Law: Case Studies of Montana,
North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, 16 VT. J. ENV. L. 363 (2015).
196. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT,
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997).
197. See supra notes 50 (psychological set), 38–47 (outcomes literature) and accompanying text.
198. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003).
199. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED (2002).
200. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 744 (1995); Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences
Into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1629, 1657 (2010).
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richly generative, sparking critiques201 and hybridizations.202 As to the
U.S. Supreme Court in particular, a rational choice alternative has posited
that the Justices behave, at least in part, strategically. Rather than
sincerely voting their preferences, judges in a rational-choice model seek
to influence their colleagues’ votes from certiorari to the final opinion.203
Both models explain judicial decision-making by recourse to something
more than law itself.204 Though this research has seen a renewed
flowering from the 1990s to the present, the strategic model of judicial
behavior was a live area of discourse as early as the 1960s205—and thus
would have been available to earlier parity writers.
Empiricists have sought to understand the relationship between a
judge’s identity and her decisions. George and Yoon are beginning to
explore causal relationships between various demographic parameters
and state case outcomes.206 A few studies have examined how a judge’s
social background influences her decisions.207 Academics believe that
judicial ideology matters; judges often disagree.208 To some extent, this
is a question of definitions. Judges will openly admit, for example, to
interpretive models, such as originalism or textualism, that are
ideologically inflected if not necessarily partisan in their politics.209 From
201. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory
and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2008); Dona Roy & Donald R.
Songer, Does the Attitudinal Model Explain Unanimous Reversals, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 342 (2010); Ali S.
Masood & Donald R. Songer, Reevaluating the Implications of Decision-Making Models: The Role of
Summary Decisions in U.S. Supreme Court Analysis, 1 J.L. & CTS. 363, 364 (2013).
202. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox Is Being Gored—When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 ST.
JOHN’S J. L. COMMENT. 497 (2007); Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Measuring
Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008);
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008); Jeff Yates,
Damon M. Cann & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Ideology and the Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme
Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 847 (2013).
203. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013).
204. See also NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019).
205. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History—Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE
(1997).
206. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1551 (1966); Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer, 35 VA. TAX REV. 201,
206 (2005).
208. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging:
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985).
209. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 243
(2009); JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS (2012); Harv. L. Sch., The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on
the
Reading
of
Statutes
at
8:28,
YOUTUBE
(Nov.
25,
2015),
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the vantage point of today’s empirical literature, Neuborne’s caution that
allocational decisions are motivated as much by ideology as by arid
doctrine seems common-sensical.210 The better question is how to
measure the impact of ideology on decisions211 and the extent to which
ideology is nakedly partisan.212
Judges are also susceptible to the habits of mind of any human,213
despite their efforts to overcome cognitive biases.214 Empiricists have
described the psychology of judicial decision-making,215 using behavioral
models,216 assessing the impact of cognitive biases on judges’ ability to

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (recording of a November 18, 2015 interview of
Justice Kagan as part of the Antonin Scalia Lecture Series at Harvard Law School) (“We’re all textualists
now”). But see Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 113 (2009).
210. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156–57 (1998). See also CASS
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(2006); Christina L. Boyd, Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data, http://clboyd.net/ideology.html
(last visited May 15, 2019). But see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV.
257, 259 (2005).
211. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1752 (2007); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How
Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
& Chris Guthrie, Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2056–
57 (2017).
212. See, e.g., Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 843 (1961); Todd Collins, Is the Sum Greater than Its Parts—Circuit Court Composition and
Judicial Behaviour in the Courts of Appeals, 32 LAW & POL’Y 434 (2010).
213. Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 125 (2007).
214. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Victor D.
Quintanilla, Judicial Mindsets: The Social Psychology of Implicit Theories and the Law, 90 NEB. L. REV.
611 (2012); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How
It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE, REDUCING BIAS (Sarah
E. Redfield, ed. 2017); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2017); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Andrew Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges: Framing and the Judiciary, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521
(2018); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, supra note 167.
215. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. B. REV. 406 (1968);
James W. Witt, The Bases of Judicial Decision-Making: The Need for a Reappraisal, 59 MARQ. L. REV.
551 (1976); Shari Seidman Diamond, The Challenges of Socio-Legal Research on Decision Making:
Psychological Successes and Failures, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 78 (1995); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006);
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-up versus Top-down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2006); Shari S.
Diamond, The Psychology of the Decision-Making Process, 17 ASIAN DISP. REV. 197 (2015).
216. See, e.g., THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003); Stephen J. Choi
& G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
87 (2008); Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY,
& LAW (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 11 (2013); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. &
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deal impartially with the facts—and litigants—before them,217 and tracing
how subtle and often unconscious influences like intuition,218 emotion,219
and heuristics220 sway decisions.221 Like other humans, judges are
influenced by those around them. Sophisticated analyses of the social
dynamics of judicial panels have illuminated everything from when en
banc review is granted222 to when and how stridently judges choose to
dissent.223
Judges also rely on the law—the extent to which is debated—in making
their decisions. Empiricists have traced how doctrine itself, in
combination with other factors, shapes judicial decision-making,224 in
part through studying the uniformity of interpretation of federal statutes225
MARY L. REV. 2017 (2016).
217. See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-political Attitudes
on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 31 (1999);
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts,
84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges
Ignore Inadmissible Information: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251
(2005); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Emma Cunliffe, Judging, Fast and Slow: Using
Decision-Making Theory to Explore Judicial Fact Determination, 18 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 139
(2014)); John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges Use Error
Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2014).
218. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 1381 (2006).
219. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience,
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 318–20 (2012); Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen,
Identifying Judicial Empathy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2015).
220. See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics and Biases in
Judicial Decision-Making, 41 ADVOC. Q. 49 (2013).
221. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007).
222. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review,
74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 213 (1999).
223. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Comparing Attitudinal
and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123,
123 (2004); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 109 (2011); see also Pauline T. Kim,
Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel
Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009).
224. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517,
517 (2006); Jeffrey R. Lax, Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591
(2007); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
326 (2007); Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: Do
Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?, 72 J. POL. 273 (2010); MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN,
THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); Jeffrey R. Lax,
The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 131 (2011); Scott Baker & Pauline
T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice, 4 J.L. ANALYSIS 329 (2012); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political
Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law, 74 J. POL. 765 (2012).
225. See, e.g., Todd E. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate
System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (1984); Christopher A. Cotropia, Arising Under Jurisdiction and
Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); Jason J. Czarnezki, An
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and state and lower federal courts’ compliance with U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.226 For example: Politically unified appellate panels “deferred
to the agency [under Chevron] only 33% . . . of the time when the policy
outcomes that would have resulted from adhering to doctrine appeared
inconsistent with the panel’s political preferences,” but in the “presence
of a whistleblower,” it is “almost twice as likely that doctrine will be
followed when doctrine works against the partisan policy preferences of
the court majority.”227 And state courts are, contrary to expectations,
compliant with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in criminal confession
cases, but “are evidently slightly less compelled than the circuit courts to
make certain decisions as a consequence of the factual configuration of
the case under consideration,” meaning that “due process protections . . .
Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine
in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect: An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008);
Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit
Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011); Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015); Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016); Amy Semet, Specialized
Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal
Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 519 (2019). But see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity,
94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1639 (2008).
226. See, e.g., Richard M. Johnson, Compliance and Supreme Court Decision-Making, 1967 WIS.
L. REV. 170 (1967); Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering
a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1978); John Gruhl, Anticipatory Compliance with Supreme Court
Rulings, 14 POLITY 294 (1981); Charles A. Johnson, Do Lower Courts Anticipate Changes in Supreme
Court Policies—A Few Empirical Notes, 3 LAW & POL’Y Q. 55 (1981); James L. Gibson, Institutional
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality,
25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1991); James F. Spriggs II, Explaining Bureaucratic Compliance with
Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997); Malia Reddick & Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation
by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of Supreme Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 JUST.
SYS. J. 117 (2000); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); Frank Cross, Appellate
Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMP. L. STUD. 369 (2005); Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The
Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504 (2008); Pamela
Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL.
RES. 30 (2009); Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2009); Jennifer K. Luse, Geoffrey McGovern,
Wendy L. Martinek & Sara C. Benesh, Such Inferior Courts: Compliance by Circuits with Jurisprudential
Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75 (2009); Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M.
Cameron, & Scott Camparato, Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010); Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S.
Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Sara C. Benesh, Jennifer K.
Jacobson, Amanda Schaefer & Nicole Simmons, Supreme Court GVRs and Lower-Court Reactions,
35 JUST. SYS. J. 162 (2014); Joseph L. Smith & James A. Todd, Rules, Standards, and Lower Court
Decisions, 3 J.L. & CTS. 257 (2015); Yosh Halberstam, Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel
Size in State Courts, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 94 (2016); Michael P. Fix, Justin T. Kingsland, & Matthew
D. Montgomery, The Complexities of State Court Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent,
38 JUST. SYS. J. 149 (2017). But see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
442 (2007).
227. Cross & Tiller, supra note 192, at 2172.
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are not uniformly enforced across the judicial system.”228 Federal judges
deciding state law questions rely to some extent on the decision-making
of state supreme court justices via certification.229 Some work calibrates
the influence of doctrine and other considerations like politics, identity
categories, or implicit biases on, say, the harshness of criminal
sentencing.230 This literature provides point and counterpoint to
Neuborne’s contention that the Burger Court’s jurisdictional decisions
were politicized, informed more by docket paranoia and distaste for
particular kinds of litigants than by the law itself.231 Judges are also
influenced by social pressures in combination with doctrine—for
example, appellate judges’ reversal decisions depend in part on the law
and in part on the race of the lower court judge;232 lower court judges base
their decisions both on their conception of the law and on a desire to avoid
reversal and its emotional and reputational costs. 233 Law matters, but so
do personality, politics, and social context.234
5. Judicial Working Conditions
This Section considers the empirical information available on how
judges work—what one might see if one could shadow a judge in her
daily tasks. Of course, most judges have people who do just that:
clerks.235 Earlier writers on parity identified clerks as important for
several reasons. Clerks extend a judge’s ability to complete work, and
thus judges who are allotted more clerks functionally have more time to
devote to each case. Clerks’ research, writing, and analysis capabilities

228. Benesh & Martinek, Context and Compliance, supra note 226, at 817.
229. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEG. 157, 161 (2003).
230. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuter, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of
Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 405 (2011); Joshua
B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The
Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 729, 729 (2012); JesseJustin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161 (2016).
231. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117–18.
232. Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in U.S. Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD.
S187 (2015).
233. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want?
An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2012); Alma Cohen,
Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015).
234. This fact seems to support the realist outlook of earlier writers on parity. See, e.g., Neuborne,
supra note 6, at 1106.
235. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary,
98 MARQ. L. REV. 131 (2014).
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help determine the range of considerations a judge will contemplate as
she reasons through a case; clerks may even advocate for particular
interpretations of the law.236 Some work has sought to trace and collect
the personal experiences of clerks, especially those employed by U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, both for descriptive purposes and in an attempt
to trace clerk influence.237 More recently, empiricists have identified
clerks as valuable data points possibly indicating judges’ views.238 For
example, clerks’ political leanings are correlated with the ideologies of
the judges for whom they work; for judges with unknown ideologies,
then, clerk data is tempting.239 Such data is hard to come by, which
perhaps explains the reliance on the relatively prominent U.S. Supreme
Court clerks in such research.240 Clerks are also judicial actors in their
own right, supporting their judge’s work and, perhaps, influencing her
perspective.241 Some empiricists have even gone so far recently as to
compare the influence of law clerks over judges’ decisions to that of
Rasputin over the Romanovs.242 And the focus on clerks naturally invites
the as yet unasked and unanswered question of how other court
employees, such as legal assistants or courtroom deputies, may influence
236. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 51; Neuborne, supra note 146 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of
an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1973); Zachary Wallander & Sara C. Benesh, Law Clerks as
Advisors: A Look at the Blackmun Papers, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2014).
238. See Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the Ideological Linkage
Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333 (2014); Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton,
Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 97 (2017);
Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, Measuring Judicial Ideology
Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 129 (2017).
239. Rozema et al., The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, supra note 238, at 124.
240. For aggregated data on clerks, see Law Clerk Hiring Historical Statistics, OSCAR,
https://oscar.uscourts.gov/oscar_data (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); NALP, COURTING CLERKSHIPS: THE
NALP JUDICIAL CLERKSHIP STUDY (2000), https://www.nalp.org/courtingclerkships (last visited Aug. 8,
2021); A Demographic Profile of Judicial Clerks—2006 to 2016, NALP (Oct. 2017),
https://www.nalp.org/1017research. See, e.g., Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends—Supreme Court Law Clerks
on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004) (emphasis on Supreme Court clerks).
241. See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF
THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role
of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher
Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L.
REV. 51, 53 (2008); Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in State
High Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 24 (2008); Scott Armstrong, Supreme Court Clerks as Judicial Actors and
as Sources, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 387 (2014); Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd & Amanda C. Bryan,
Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 MARQ.
L. REV. 75 (2014); Todd C. Peppers, Michael W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes:
The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in “Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313
(2014); Christopher D. Kromphardt, U.S. Supreme Court Law Clerks as Information Sources, 3 J.L. &
COURTS 277, 278–80 (2015).
242. Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, Legal Rasputins?
Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the U.S. Supreme Court, 35 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2019).
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judges’ work processes.
The federal and state courts themselves have been energetic in
gathering data and developing metrics that enable observers to understand
core questions about judicial labor. Quantitative data describe and
analyze the state and federal courts’ workloads at every level of
granularity from individual states and federal circuits up through
aggregated data on the system as a whole,243 including type of claim
brought;244 judges’ caseloads, weighted for complexity;245 and case
dispositions.246 By compiling these data into workload assessments, court
systems can better manage caseloads and assess the need for additional
personnel.247 Thus, the federal and state courts have both provided the
data and created the kinds of metrics called for in earlier conversations on
parity.248

243. See, e.g., State Court Organization, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/datacollection/census-state-court-organization#documentation-0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). Compare
Research, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (compiling and
making available data for analysis, such as the Integrated Database (IDB) of all federal cases filed since
1970), and Integrated Database (IDB), FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021) with Matthew Kleiman, Cynthia G. Lee, & Brian J. Ostrom, Workload Assessment: A Datadriven Management Tool for the Judicial Branch, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (2013),
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/2088.
The Court Statistics Project collects and analyzes data on all 50 states’ courts. See NCSC
Analysis, COURT STAT. PROJECT, https://www.courtstatistics.org/ncsc-analysis (last visited Aug. 8, 2021);
see also R. Schauffler, R. LaFountain, S. Strickland, K. Holt & K. Genthon, eds., Interactive Data
Displays, COURT STAT. PROJECT, https://www.courtstatistics.org/court-statistics/interactive-caseloaddata-displays (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); S. Strickland, R. Schauffler, R. LaFountain & K. Holt, eds., State
Court Organization Data, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/sco/data (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021).
244. See, e.g., PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, COURT STAT., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION
IN STATE COURTS: EXAMINING DEBT COLLECTION, LANDLORD/TENANT AND SMALL CLAIMS CASES,
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/53658/
caseload-highlights.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
245. See
Judicial
Business
of
the
United
States
Courts,
U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (last
visited Aug. 8, 2021); Court Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Servicesand-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Court-statistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). For historical context on
the federal caseload data available, see History of Federal Caseload Reporting, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/history-federal-caseload-reporting (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
246. Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/analysis-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (federal courts);
Interactive Data Displays, supra note 243 (state courts).
247. See,
e.g.,
Workload
Assessment,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
STATE
COURTS,
https://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-expertise/workload-assessment (last visited Aug. 8,
2021).
248. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., INDIANA JUDICIAL BRANCH,
Weighted Caseload Measures, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3330.htm (last visited May 10, 2019).
But see Sheppard, supra note 216 (effect of time pressure on judicial decision-making).
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B. Litigant Characteristics and Behaviors
Though we know quite a lot about judges and their work, we know
relatively less about the attorneys and litigants who appear before them.
The empirical data here are patchy and generally too aggregated to be
useful comparatively. We know quite a bit about the practice of forumshopping, especially with regard to patent and asbestos litigation.249 From
a parity perspective, we can infer that attorneys and litigants forum-shop
because they perceive a meaningful difference between fora.250 Casetype data tells us something about litigants: for example, the federal courts
track prisoner, habeas, and pro se litigation.251 Litigant and attorney
identity, especially in disputes with a partisan valence, seems to matter to
outcomes;252 quality of advocacy, to the extent it can be measured, may
not.253
Broad demographic statistics about the legal profession are available
from the American Bar Association and others.254 Unfortunately, these
are neither causal nor localized enough to make meaningful comparison
between attorneys working primarily in state as opposed to federal
practice, for example, as suggested by earlier parity commentators.255
249. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001); Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural
Innovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006); James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping
and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 355, 359 (2008); Scott E. Atkinson,
Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping,
and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011); William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the
Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
151 (2013).
250. See, e.g., Victor E. Flango, Attorneys’ Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases,
25 AKRON L. REV. 41 (1991).
251. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/judicial-business-2018 (last accessed Aug. 8, 2021); see also Mitchell Levy, Comment, Empirical
Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in Federal District Courts, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2018).
252. See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Litigant Partisan Identity and Challenges to Campaign Finance
Policies: An Examination of U.S. District Court Decisions, 1971–2007, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 212 (2015);
Adam Feldman, Who Wins in the Supreme Court: An Examination of Attorney and Law Firm Influence,
100 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 434 (2016).
253. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence,
9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 73 (2010); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’
Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (2013); Adam Feldman, Counting on Quality: The
Effects of Merits Brief Quality on Supreme Court Decisions, 94 DENV. L. REV. 43 (2016); Emily S. Taylor
Poppe & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Do Lawyers Matter: The Effect of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes,
43 PEPP. L. REV. 881 (2016). But see, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Inadequate Defense Counsel: An Empirical
Analysis of Prisoners’ Perceptions, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1979); Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L.
Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s Perspective: Empirical
Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 81, 104 (2001).
254. See
Legal
Profession
Statistics,
AM. BAR ASS’N (AUG. 5, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/profession_statistics/.
255. See Flango, supra note 54, at 973.
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One longitudinal sociological and ethnographic study on the Chicago
bar256 provides an example of what would be necessary to explore the
comparative empirical questions that Neuborne and others had in mind—
whether, for example, there are subtle local hierarchies of status and
education between attorneys who practice primarily in state court versus
those who practice primarily in federal court.
Such data might enrich the litigant-choice principle advanced by
Chemerinsky and others. Thicker information could reveal how and why
litigants make choices, the impact that litigant choices have on other
actors in the system—particularly judges—and the relationship between
such impact and case outcomes. For this reason, and because litigants and
counsel are the most numerous categories of court-system actors,
additional empirical work in this realm would be helpful.
C. Empirical Reflexivity in the Court Systems
Our nation’s court systems regularly deploy data in service of their own
improvement. The federal courts are required by statute257 to collect and
report on a wide array of data points.258 The state courts are not uniformly
required to do this, but the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) acts
as a clearinghouse for such information and marshals it in service of state
court improvement.259 The NCSC’s workload assessment, and the
Federal Judicial Center’s caseload metrics for example, are designed to
enable court administrators to ask their respective legislatures for
additional judges and resources.260 CourTools has created a set of metrics
to assess trial court performance261 which could easily be applied in
service of the parity question. Federal courts hearing habeas or abstention
claims might even be able to make use of such information, if briefed, in
understanding the quality of justice available in the relevant state court.
In short, the courts have understood the uses of empirics for selfimprovement262 and for making the case for financial and human

256. JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN,
URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005).
257. Federal Judicial Center Statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (1992).
258. See supra notes 243–247 and accompanying text.
259. About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/about-us (last visited Aug.
8, 2021).
260. See supra notes 243–247; see also 28 U.S.C § 620(b)(2).
261. Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS, https://www.courtools.org/trial-courtperformance-measures (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
262. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federaljudiciary_strategicplan2020.pdf; see also FED. JUD.
CTR., Research, supra note 243; About Us, supra note 259; see also David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging
Measures, 77 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 381 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
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resources263 to the legislative and executive branches. The state courts in
particular have heeded Bator’s call: because they hold such responsibility
under our current allocational model (no matter what one thinks of this
arrangement from a normative perspective), they had better perform their
role as well as possible.264
D. Establishing Comparative Benchmarks
The question of parity between state and federal courts must also be
situated with respect to two other comparative questions: First, are the
federal courts really the gold standard? Second, how do U.S. courts
compare with the courts of other countries? International rule-of-law
rankings place the United States lower than one might hope.265 The
American public similarly has a not entirely favorable view of the
courts.266 Indeed, improving the American public’s perceptions of and
trust in the court system is a major strategic goal of the federal courts.267
Unlawful corruption is a problem, particularly in certain states.268
“Lawful corruption,” or the various means by which special interests are
permitted to influence litigation outcomes,269 is a much bigger problem.270
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1745 (2008).
263. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 262, at 24; Budget Resource Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021).
264. Bator, supra note 51, at 624.
265. WORLD
JUST.
PROJECT,
RULE
OF
LAW
INDEX
2020
(2020),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf. The United
States’ overall ranking is 21. Most concerningly, it is one of the 25 previously-stable countries whose
rule of law is declining. WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020 INSIGHTS 14 (2020),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP%20Insights%202020%20%20Online%20.pdf.
266. In 2019, sixty-five percent of Americans had at least some confidence in state courts —a
twelve percent decrease from the previous year. Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court also declined
from 2018 but to a lesser extent (four percent). See GBA STRATEGIES, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
2019
STATE
OF
THE
STATE
COURTS—SURVEY
ANALYSIS
2
(2019),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16731/sosc_2019_survey_analysis_2019.pdf. But see
Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 709 (2011).
267. Issue 2: Preserving Public Trust, Confidence, and Understanding, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/issue-7-enhancing-public-understanding-trust-andconfidence (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
268. Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Illegal and Legal Corruption in American
States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey, HARV. UNIV. EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR
ETHICS (Dec. 1, 2014), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-americanstates-some-results-safra.
269. See supra notes 172–195 and accompanying text.
270. See Dincer & Johnston, supra note 268; see also Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and
Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013). But see Stratos Pahis, Corruption in
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Ultimately, the comparative capacity project must point not only to which
court system is “better” for a given purpose, but also to how both the state
and federal courts can be improved.
E. Empirical Lacunae
Though the parity debate can never be answered conclusively, the
wealth of data available on the courts provides many avenues for
exploration and argument. There is an imbalance between state and
federal data—far more is available on the federal courts. What’s more,
the metrics used for each system often differ, making comparison harder.
But because both court systems have made such progress in developing
metrics and analytics, it is conceptually straightforward to continue
developing information on both court systems in parallel.
The scale and aggregation of the data that exist also makes it somewhat
difficult to grasp local variability. Even where data are available on all
fifty states,271 it seems likely there could still be substantial differences
from one to another. Some of these gaps might be filled with more
qualitative, granular research such as ethnographies. But these would
have to be carefully conceived and designed to be both particularized and
generalizable, given that it is impossible to do qualitative work on every
court in the country. Indeed, though filling the gaps in the comparative
data set is not conceptually difficult, it would require a substantial
infusion of both human and financial resources. Nonetheless, the
conceptual clarity means that those able to pursue such studies face few
problems of research design.
Finally, there are still areas where good data may remain elusive.
Despite groundbreaking advances in the psychological study of judges
and clerks’ willingness to share their experiences, it seems unlikely that
academe will ever fully crack open the black box of real-world judicial
decision-making. Modeling the quality of attorneys, beyond imperfect
proxies like education and years of experience, seems too subjective to be
useful. And even where data are available, they may be unusable for
certain purposes at scale. For example, though nationwide comparisons
of the state and federal caseloads are available, they do not necessarily
tell the U.S. Supreme Court where to send one type of case or another and
why. Some questions remain in the sphere of the normative.

Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, 118 YALE L.J. 1900 (2009).
271. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, National Overview, https://www.courtstatistics.org/ncscanalysis/national-overview (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
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IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW COMPARATIVE CONVERSATION
The earlier parity debate stalled because it concerned itself almost
exclusively with allocation and, implicitly, with trying to persuade the
U.S. Supreme Court to change its allocational jurisprudence. It critiqued
the Court for affirming a strong-parity model when in fact the Court did
not base its decisions on any kind of parity claim, much less one of
fungibility. But federal courts scholars can find new ways into thinking
about the comparative capacities of the state and federal courts by making
use of the wealth of empirical research that has since emerged. This
Article also proposes empirical interventions for other decisionmakers—
such as legislators, litigants, and federal district judges.
Empirics about the courts may or may not matter much to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Indeed, it is hard to see how the Justices could make
good use of empirical evidence of such a wide and diverse system even if
they wanted to do so. But facts are relevant to the hundreds of federal
judges, thousands of state judges, and millions of attorneys and litigants
who comprise our nation’s court systems, and to the legislators who are
tasked with resourcing the courts—and to the critics and policy thinkers
whose role is to suggest new ways forward. These actors may not be able
to control the allocation of entire classes of cases, but they influence the
cases they touch directly and may base their decisions—where to file,
whether to abstain, how to argue or decide a habeas claim—on knowledge
of the courts in their ambit.
Future additions to the parity debate could most productively make use
of empirical data in the kinds of hot spots where the question of
comparison between the state and federal courts becomes most
relevant.272 Parity hot spots emerge where allocational doctrine enables
concurrency between the state and federal courts, or contemplates federal
courts stepping in where state courts can be said to be inadequate in some
way, and where conditions of fact make the choice of forum particularly
salient. This conclusion plays out three such case studies and then opens
onto a broader, empirically-informed parity debate.
First, and most importantly, we can all participate in the project of
helping the courts to attain the highest degree of competence possible.
Bator is right: regardless of one’s normative priors, “[i]t is not enough to
assert that the federal forum may be the more hospitable forum; we must
also create conditions for assuring that the state courts will become a more
hospitable forum, that the rhetoric of parity becomes a reality.”273 Rather

272. See supra notes 127–138 and accompanying text.
273. Bator, supra note 51, at 624.
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than debating how to allocate millions of cases274 among a finite judicial
workforce,275 both systems, but particularly the state courts, appear to
require an infusion of resources. Allocational doctrine in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries has suffered from a sort of “docket paranoia,”
particularly with regard to the federal courts, which has resulted in calls
to abolish diversity jurisdiction and the significant curtailment of federal
jurisdiction over § 1983 and habeas claims among others.276 But the
federal courts hear less than ten percent of all cases filed in the United
States.277 The federal judiciary may well be overworked; that does not
mean, however, that the state courts can take on more cases.
It is up to legislators to direct resources to state courts. State
legislatures, of course, need only decide to spend more money on their
courts. But the U.S. Congress should also consider granting money to the
states for this purpose. Congress could simply decide that the adequacy
of state courts is a compelling national interest that deserves funding in
its own right. But to the extent that Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court
feel that parts of the federal docket should be shifted to the states, the
federal government may, according to some readings, be strongly advised
to provide funding to facilitate this shift. On one hand, the Constitution
provides both that the state courts are legally sufficient to handle all
federal judicial business,278 and that the state courts have the “power and
duty” to hear federal claims, under the Supremacy Clause.279 On the other
hand, a state could argue that the federal government is improperly
commandeering its courts to handle what is a federal responsibility.280
274. In 2016, the last year for which aggregated data is available, 84.2 million cases were filed in
state courts. See COURT STAT. PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
DIGEST:
2016
DATA
1
(2018),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/23897/sccd_2016.pdf. In 2019, 376,762 cases
were filed in the federal district courts. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 (last visited Aug. 8,
2021).
275. For example, in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2020, each federal district judge
carried an average of 885 pending cases. See U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—
NATIONAL
JUDICIAL
CASELOAD
PROFILE
1
(2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2020.pdf.
276. See supra note 6.
277. George & Yoon, Gavel Gap, supra note 155.
278. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
279. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947).
280. The federal government may not “commandeer” “state officers to execute federal laws.”
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997). Any federal law of sufficient scope to provide
meaningful assistance to the state courts in discharging their duties to hear federal cases might be cast as
the kind of compulsion of “state officials to administer a federal regulatory program” disavowed in Printz.
Id. at 936. But the Printz Court suggests a way forward for cooperative federalism, following “Hamilton’s
statement in The Federalist No. 36 . . . that the Federal Government would in some circumstances do well
‘to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of
their emoluments’—which surely suggests inducing state officers to come aboard by paying them, rather
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And practically speaking, it may be politically infeasible to add many
more cases to state dockets without providing additional resources.
Theoretically, state courts should not require any compensation or
incentive to hear any number of federal claims.281 But out of fairness to
the states, and out of a desire to ensure robust and fair adjudication of all
claims, policymakers may choose to draw on the commandeering
analysis.
Second, judicial actors other than the U.S. Supreme Court might
engage empirical information. Both scholars and litigants should
consider how they might direct mixed normative and empirical arguments
toward these decisionmakers, particularly in the areas of abstention and
habeas. Abstention doctrine relies heavily on the rhetoric of equity,
leaving substantial room for federal district judges to exercise their “wise
discretion” and “considerations of wise judicial administration” in
choosing whether to keep the case.282 Federal district judges could
consider a wide array of data points about the particular state court in
question, to determine whether a given case is one of the rare instances
when abstention is appropriate.283 Some of these may be issues of law:
for example, Pullman directs a district court to consider whether the
relevant state’s law “appears to furnish easy and ample means” for
deciding the question, such as certification.284 A court might also
consider the scope and adequacy of a state’s procedural law. The U.S.
Supreme Court took such considerations into account in Mitchum v.
Foster, noting, after reviewing Reconstruction-era history, that § 1983
was enacted against the backdrop of Congress’ concern that “state
instrumentalities could not protect” federal constitutional rights.285
But a district court need not be limited to law. A litigant could brief
the issue by recourse to data about the particular state court’s track record,
attempting to make or rebut a “showing that . . . obvious methods for
securing a definitive ruling in the state courts cannot be pursued with full
protection of the constitutional claim.”286 Such data might include
information about the capacity of the state court as compared with the
federal court: the amount of time it will take to decide the case; data on
any discrepancy in win rates for the given type of claim, along with any
than merely commandeering their official services.” Id. at 914. It is certainly in the spirit of Printz, if not
required by its letter, for the federal government to make significant grants to the state courts in support
of their duty and capacity to hear federal claims and enforce federal rights.
281. Testa, 330 U.S. at 391.
282. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 645 (1941); Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (quotations omitted).
283. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
284. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 645.
285. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242.
286. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 645.
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potential explanations for this discrepancy, such as a tendency of elected
judges to decide against that type of litigant; a strong likelihood of
implicit bias by judges against litigants of the same demographic; and,
following Colorado River’s exhortation to “conserv[e] judicial
resources,” a consideration of the impact of that single case, or class of
cases, on the state’s court system as compared with the local federal
courts.287
And because federal courts are to abstain only rarely under conditions
of concurrency,288 empirical data situating the case among other similar
conflicts would also help the court to determine, for example, whether the
case “bear[s] on policy problems of substantial public import,” or whether
the state has a “coherent policy” on point and the precise extent to which
the case at issue would disturb that policy—in essence, determining
whether the case is truly, verifiably exceptional.289 Lower courts have
broad discretion in making abstention determinations, with very little
doctrine to guide the decision. Comparative capacity empirics can help
litigants and courts to fill that gap.
And federal district judges evaluating habeas petitions might look to
empirical information about the state court that convicted the petitioner
to calibrate their evaluations of whether that individual had a “full and
fair” opportunity to litigate her claims in that forum. 290 In particular, a
habeas petitioner’s briefing might direct the federal judge to the literature
on judicial elections, and to the fact that elected state judges tend to be
“tough on crime” in the periods immediately preceding an election,291
especially where crime has been the subject of television advertising for
or against judicial candidates.292 A habeas petitioner who was convicted
only a few months before an election, especially of a type of crime that
received media coverage, would have a strong argument that the federal
judge should view the validity of the state court’s adjudication with more
skepticism than someone convicted shortly after an election or of a less
sensationalized crime. If the federal judge believed the state court’s
decision to be swayed by the election cycle, that could be grounds for
finding that the state court had made an “unreasonable application” of
federal law,293 or that the habeas petitioner had not had a “full and fair”
opportunity to litigate her claim—dramatically changing the scope of the

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; see supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
Id. at 814.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976).
See supra notes 129, 130.
See supra note 182.
See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text.
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case.294 But current habeas doctrine also contains another important
teaching for federal courts thinkers: because the U.S. Supreme Court after
AEDPA has essentially been confined to statutory interpretation in
determining the boundaries of federal habeas, jurisdictional arguments,
especially those based on empirics, are far more productively directed to
Congress than the Court. Such arguments are needed: given that we know
state courts are less willing to enforce bedrock criminal rights, revision of
the habeas statutes to enable more expansive federal review should be an
urgent priority.
Third, the question of parity from the litigant perspective remains
underdeveloped. Normatively, we need multiple, context-specific
definitions of quality advocacy which would in turn enable empirical
assessment. We need a fuller normative conversation about what makes
courts constitutionally adequate from the litigant’s perspective to ensure
that litigants’ interests in fair adjudication are met even if they do not win.
Empirically, we need highly granular information such that litigants can
compare, or at least understand, the particular courts in which their case
might be heard rather than relying on data about the court systems as a
whole. Industry already provides some of this particularized information
via big-data capabilities.295
More broadly, federal courts scholars writing in doctrinal, theoretical,
and historical modes must develop normative models for the adequacy of
court systems—both comparative and singular—and the actors therein
that can both make use of existing data and generate further factfinding.
A few points of contention from the parity debate of the late twentieth
century seem definitively to have been resolved by the data and methods
that have been developed since. Such facts can then ground new
normative conversations. For example, we now know that judicial
selection processes make a difference. Participants in the earlier parity
debate argued about whether elected state judges were as independent as
appointed federal judges; because we now know that the answer to that
question is, on the whole, “no,” we can engage the debate taking place in
the political science literature as to whether or not it is desirable for judges
to be fully independent from the public. We also know that, relative to
the state courts, the federal courts are not overburdened. Therefore,
normative critiques of jurisdictional doctrine might focus not on whether
classes of cases should be excluded from the federal courts due to system
capacity alone; rather, we might think normatively about which kinds of
294. If the Stone Court had found that Mr. Powell had not had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate
his claim in state court, his Fourth Amendment claim would have been back in the case, allowing him to
exclude the murder weapon from evidence—a potentially transformative result. 428 U.S. at 468–71.
295. See, e.g., Free Report on Any Federal Judge or Opposing Counsel, THOMSON REUTERS,
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/free-litigation-analytics-report (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
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cases are best suited for the particular affordances of each court system
and seek to resource each of these systems appropriately.296 And future
writers on parity might think about how they can address their critiques
not only to the U.S. Supreme Court but also to Congress, given Congress’
unique ability to shape jurisdiction based on factfinding about the courts.
The data are, for the most part, available. Scholars should use them to
move both the literature and the courts themselves forward.
The flourishing of data on the courts since the proclaimed end of the
parity debate calls for the reconsideration of empirical questions
embedded therein. But the empirics also invite a reconceptualization of
parity on new terms as a comparison of the characteristics and capacity of
the state and federal courts. This Article has untangled the earlier parity
debate to bring the two literatures into conversation and to spark new
comparative work. Above all else, the important question is not which
court system is “better,” but rather how both court systems can best be
supported in their crucial work.

296. See Neuborne, supra note 16, at 803.
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